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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah from which 
this appeal arises, is based on U.C.A. 78-3-4(l)(1953, as amended). Jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)Q)(1995 Supp.) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Was it reversible error for the District Court to impose a strict order in which 
depositions were to be taken and to prevent JMS from taking third party depositions until 
the opposing party had the opportunity to depose JMS' principal members? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs' Motion and Memorandum to Continue 
Discovery and Trial Date and for Scheduling Order R. 670-762 and Reply to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Continue Discovery and Trial Date 
and for Scheduling Order R. 795-800. Also, Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Discovery and 
the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Extend Discovery R. 1356-1406 and Plaintiffs 
Reply Memorandum R. 2070-2074. Also, oral arguments made during hearings 
pertaining to said motions R. 805-809; 3707. 
2. Was it reversible error for the District Court to prevent JMS from taking the 
depositions of third parties which would have either produced or led to the production of 
admissible evidence and to fail to allow sufficient time for discovery especially in light of 
the discovery abuses committed by CAT? 
1 
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Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs' Motion and Memorandum to Continue 
Discovery and Trial Date and for Scheduling Order R. 670-762 and Reply to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Continue Discovery and Trial Date 
and for Scheduling Order R. 795-800. Also, Plaintiffsy Motion to Extend Discovery and 
the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Extend Discovery R. 1356-1406 and Plaintiffs' 
Reply Memorandum R. 2070-2074. Also, oral arguments made during hearings 
pertaining to said motions R. 805-809; 3707. Plaintiffs' Motions and Memoranda to 
Compel the Depositions of Paul Taggart and John Coats R. 2034-2069\ Plaintiffs' Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motions to Compel and for Sanctions R. 2576-2588. 
3. Was it reversible error for the District Court to deny JMS' Rule 56(f) motion for 
continuance where discovery was far from complete, and JMS had met the requirements 
outlined in the rule? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffsy Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance to Obtain 
Affidavits and Deposition Transcripts and Testimony and to Permit the Completion of 
Discovery, as well as the memoranda and reply memorandum in support of said motion, 
R.856-1107,1289-1326, and arguments made at hearing on the motion held December 
19, 2001 R. 1327. 
4. Was it reversible error for the District Court to conclude that there was no 
evidence to support JMS' alter ego claim and to dismiss it with prejudice via summary 
judgment where evidence of alter ego was presented, and further, where discovery 
necessary to present that claim had not yet been completed and JMS had requested a 
-2-
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continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs' Alternative Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (consolidated with Memorandum in Support of 
Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance to Obtain Affidavits and Deposition Transcripts and 
Testimony and to Permit the Completion of Discovery), as well as the memoranda and 
reply memorandum in support of said motion, R.856-1107,1289-1326, and arguments 
made at hearing on the motion held December 19, 2001 R. 1327, Also, Plaintiffs' 
Objections to Proposed Order Granting Summary Judgment and additional reply to 
Defendants Memorandum R.2552-2575, 3448-3706, 3707. 
5. Was it reversible error for the District Court to dismiss JMS5 second cause of 
action for breach of contract and fiduciary duty with prejudice via summary judgment 
where JMS presented evidence demonstrating that there were genuine issues of material 
fact in dispute? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs' Alternative Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (consolidated with Memorandum in Support of 
Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance to Obtain Affidavits and Deposition Transcripts and 
Testimony and to Permit the Completion of Discovery), as well as the memoranda and 
reply memorandum in support of said motion, R.856-1107,1289-1326, and arguments 
made at hearing on the motion held December 19, 2001 R. 1327. Also, Plaintiffs' 
Objections to Proposed Order Granting Summary Judgment and additional reply to 
Defendants Memorandum R.2552-2575, 3448-3706, 3707. 
-3-
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6. Was it reversible error for the District Court to deny JMS the right to jury trial 
where JMS requested and paid the fee for a jury trial at the time the Complaint was filed, 
and JMS never waived its jury trial right? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs' oral argument at scheduling conference held 
March 3 0,2001R. 3 771-3 774 and Plaintiffs' Motion and Memorandum for 
Reconsideration of Court's Ruling on Jury Trial, as well as the Affidavits of Brian W. 
Steffensen and David C. Condie submitted in connection therewith, R. 3 779-3 795. 
7. Was it reversible error for the District Court to rely on its own independent 
recollection of the discovery hearing held on April 18, 2000 to decide in March and 
whether any statements pertaining to waiver of the right to jury trial existed, 
essentially making the Judge a witness in the matter? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs 'oral argument at scheduling conference held 
March 30,2001R. 3771-3774 and Plaintiffs'Motion and Memorandum for 
Reconsideration of Court's Ruling on Jury Trial, as well as the Affidavits of Brian W. < 
Steffensen and David C Condie submitted in connection therewith, R. 3779-3795. 
8. Was it reversible error for the District Court to deny JMS5 Motions to Continue 
Trial Date, where good cause existed for continuance and no prejudice would have 
resulted to the Defendants? 
Preserved for appeal R. 673, 795, 859,1358,1711,1726, 3718, 3720. 
9. Was it reversible error for the District Court to deny JMS' motion to amend 
their complaint to conform to the evidence, both before and after trial, where good cause < 
-4-
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existed therefore and no prejudice would have resulted to the Defendants? 
Preserved for appeal R. 3737, 5377-5381. 
10. With respect to Judge Bohling's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, a copy 
of which is attached hereto in Addendum 1, was it reversible error for Judge Bohling 
to make the following identified Findings of Fact: 
"Aspenwood ... [was] organized ... for the purpose of... and possibly acquiring 
and developing other real estate projects." (Finding No. 1) 
"CAT was to be an investor providing some funds for the purchase and 
development activities of Aspenwood and was to be a silent partner." (Finding No. 
2) 
"In this connection, Mehr had a number of meetings and telephone 
conversations with Rosen in which he provided Rosen with the necessary information 
concerning Hidden Ridge for Rosen to prepare a full proforma concerning the project. 
Mehr did not make any misrepresentations to the JMS Group concerning Hidden 
Ridge or Aspenwood or fail to disclose information he was obligated to disclose. 
Mehr informed the JMS Group of the status of Hidden Ridge, what had to be done to 
complete Phase 1 and the anticipated costs. No member of the JMS Group ever 
complained that Mehr had made any misrepresentations or committed fraud. 
(Finding No. 12) 
"Rosen prepared his initial pro formas based on the information received from 
Mehr and information received from the other members of the JMS Group. None of 
-5-
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the information contained in the post-Taggart meeting pro forma was established to 
have been based on any information received from Taggart T (Finding No. 13) 
"In November, 1998, the JMS Group wanted to meet with Taggart to confirm 
certain of the information that Mehr had provided to the JMS Group. Mehr arranged 
for Taggart to attend the meeting which took place at Steffensen's office near 
Thanksgiving, 1998. In attendance at the meeting were Taggart, Mehr, Steffensen, 
Rosen and the Watsons." (Finding No. 14.) 
"The memories of those in attendance at the Thanksgiving Meeting 
concerning what was said at the meeting were vague. It is unclear to the court what 
was said at the meeting, but it is clear to the court that the meeting was of limited 
significance to the parties'." (Finding No. 15) 
"It was discussed that Russell/Packard was supposed to close its first nine 
lots within 10 days after building permits were available and that building permits 
were available on October 16, 1998, but that Russell/Packard was taking the position 
it would not close until the offsite water line being constructed by Baucorp was 
completed." (Finding No. 15) 
"Taggart reasonably and in good faith believed Mehr would complete the 
water and sewer by those dates" (Finding No. 15) 
The evidence does not establish that Taggart made any misrepresentations or 
omitted to disclose any information he was obligated to disclose concerning sales or 
future closings or sales at the Thanksgiving Meeting" (Finding No. 15) 
-6-
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All of Finding No 16. 
All of Finding No. 17. 
All of Finding No. 18. 
All of Finding No. 19. 
AllofFindingNo.20. 
"Taggart did not make any misrepresentations concerning Mehr or fail to 
disclose any information concerning Mehr he was obligated to disclose" 
(Finding No. 21) 
"The JMS Group could have asked David Steffensen about Mehr. The 
evidence does not support the proposition that Taggart told the JMS Group anything 
about Mehr that was either false or misleading or that the JMS Group relied upon 
any statements made about Mehr that were untrue" (Finding No. 22) 
"On November 25, 1998, shortly after the Thanksgiving Meeting ...." 
(Finding No. 23) 
"During the first week of December, 1990, Taggart attended a meeting with 
Steffesen and Mehr at Steffensen's office." (Finding No. 24) 
"No misrepresentations were made to Steffensen nor did Taggart fail to 
disclose information that he was obligated to disclose to Steffensen at this second 
meeting" (FindingNo. 24) 
"Mehr provided the Summons and Complaint to Steffensen and 
-7-
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discussed the lawsuit with Steffensen ... After obtaining an extension of time, 
Steffensen filed an Answer and Counterclaim .... The court concludes that JMS was 
aware of the dispute with Russell/Packard and of the termination of 
Russell/Packard's contract prior to JMS' purchase of its interest in Aspenwood and 
that JMS was not concerned with that dispute. The court further concludes that JMS 
was aware of the Russell/Packard lawsuit at the time JMS acquired its interest in 
Aspenwood or within a few days after that purchase and was not concerned with the < 
lawsuit. There was no credible evidence that Taggart believed JMS was not aware of 
the lawsuit at the time JMS acquired its interest in Aspenwood." (Finding No. 25) 
"... or what information Taggart provided at the Thanksgiving Meeting that 
was included in the final pro for ma ...." (Finding No. 26) 
AllofFindingNo.28. 
AllofFindingNo.29. 
"The court concludes that were no warranties, written or oral, made by < 
CAT, Taggart or Coats to JMS " (Finding No. 30) 
"The evidence does not establish that JMS decided to purchase its interest in 
. . - • • • • ' 
Aspenwood based upon any information received from Taggart. The evidence does 
establish that JMS relied upon information it received from Mehr and its own 
investigation in deciding to purchase Aspenwood. (Finding No. 31) 
All of Finding No. 32. -
-8-
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"JMS understood, and the court finds, that Americraft's purported 
termination of the contract on the basis that the sewer was not completed was 
pretextual. Americraft 's obligation to close lots was not conditioned upon 
completion of the sewer. Americraft was attempting to get out of the contract 
because it did not have sales. ... Taggart did not make any misrepresentations to 
JMS with respect to Americraft nor did Taggart omit to disclose information 
concerning Americraft that he was obligated to disclose. Prior to December 17, 
1998, Taggart had no reason to believe that Americraft would not close lots in 
accordance with its contract and its previous representations to Taggart or until the 
sewer was completed." (Finding No. 33) 
"The court concludes that as of December 11, 1998, Americraft intended to 
close further purchases of lots at least by the first part of January" (Finding No. 
34) 
"The largest unanticipated cost was to complete construction of an offsite 
road as required by Springville City rather than to merely widen the road. The cost 
incurred to do so was an extra approximately $130,000.0. Mehr did not find out 
about this additional cost until 1999. Taggart did not know about additional costs 
nor was there any evidence that he should have known about the additional costs at 
the time of the sale of JMS." (Finding No.3 5) 
"There is no credible evidence that Taggart made any misrepresentations 
with respect to the fill and compaction, that JMS asked Taggart what it would cost to 
-9-
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{ 
fill and compact the dirt or that Taggart knew what it would cost. Nor was there any 
evidence as to what it would cost to compact the dirt. JMS knew of the necessity of 
filling and compacting the lots and could reasonably have determined the cost of this 
work." (Finding No. 36) 
i 
"Taggart did not make any misrepresentations to JMS or fail to disclose 
any material information he was obligated to disclose with respect to the value of 
these lots. There was not credible evidence that Taggart knew that these lots did not < 
have substantial value, even if it were assumed that was the case" (Finding No. 37). 
" ... and that this same problem caused a delay in completion of the off site 
sewer and cost approximately $20,000.00 to remedy after JMS acquired is interest in 
Aspenwood. However, there was no evidence that the water problem in the 
i 
southeast section of the project was not remedied long before JMS acquired its 
interest or that the problem was the same as that encountered after JMS acquired its i 
interest. In this regard, it is obvious that the problems were not the same because the t 
offsite sewer line came from northwest of the project" (Finding No. 38) 
All of Finding 39. 
"There was no evidence that Taggart was asked anything about the Prisbrey 
loan or that JMS did not know of the Prisbrey loan. ... Taggart did not make any 
misrepresentations to JMS concerning the Prisbrey loan nor did he fail to disclose 
any information he was obligated to disclose concerning the Prisbrey loan" (The 
second Finding No. 39) < 
-10-
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All of Findings Nos. 40, 41 and 42. 
"The JMS Group was comprised of experienced hard money lenders with a 
high level of sophistication in business matters.... The JMS Group understood that it 
was undertaking substantial risks in acquiring the interest in Aspenwood'' (Finding 
No. 44) 
"As part of the agreement, Newport, Hoggan and Oman agreed that 
Aspenwood could take free of charge from Phase 2 the dirt necessary to fill the lots 
in Phase 1" (Finding No. 45) 
All of Finding No. 46. 
11. Was it reversible error for the District Court to conclude that JMS was not 
entitled to recover on its intentional fraud claim, and that neither CAT nor Taggart made 
any misrepresentations of material facts to JMS concerning Hidden Ridge or Aspenwood 
nor did they fail to disclose facts that they were obligated to disclose to JMS concerning 
Hidden Ridge or Aspenwood? 
12. Was it reversible error for the District Court to conclude as a matter of law that 
JMS failed to carry its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence or by a 
preponderance of the evidence that CAT or Taggart intentionally or recklessly defrauded 
JMS into acquiring its interest in Aspenwood? 
13. Was it reversible error for the District Court to conclude as a matter of law 
that neither CAT nor Taggart intended to defraud JMS with respect to its acquisition of its 
interest in Aspenwood? 
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( 
14. Was it reversible error for the District Court to conclude as a matter of law 
that JMS is not entitled to recover on its purported negligent misrepresentation claim? 
15. Was it reversible error for the District Court to conclude as a matter of law 
that JMS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the 
evidence that CAT or Taggart were guilty of making negligent misrepresentations 
concerning Hidden Ridge of Aspenwood? 
16. Was it reversible error for the District Court to conclude as a matter of law that i 
Dan Mehr was not acting as the agent of CAT or Taggart in his communications with 
JMS and that his statements, representations and conduct cannot be imputed to CAT or 
Taggart? 
17. Was it reversible error for the District Court to conclude as a matter of law 
that representations concerning future costs to complete an future closing of sales were 
speculative predictions of future events and not representations of present facts, and that 
any statements made by Taggart in this regard were made in good faith and were not < 
without a basis in fact or made recklessly? 
18. Was it reversible error for the District Court to conclude as a matter of law that 
< 
certain representations made by Appellants concerning a dispute with Ken Hoggan and 
Lonnie Oman, who were the prior owners of Hidden Ridge, as well as additional 
representations concerning the viability and profitability of the Hidden Ridge real estate 
project were not actionable? 
19. Was it reversible error for the District Court to conclude as a matter of law that 
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JMS did not reasonably rely upon any statements made by Taggart concerning Hidden 
Ridge or Aspenwood, and that JMS did not suffer any damages as a proximate result of 
any representations or omissions by Taggart? 
20. Was it reversible error for the District Court to conclude as a matter of law that 
neither CAT nor Taggart made any written or oral warranties to JMS with respect to 
Hidden Ridge or Aspenwood, nor did they breach any warranties? 
21. Was it reversible error for the District Court to conclude as a matter of law that 
JMS and JMS Financial breached the December 17, 1998 Agreement by failing to pay the 
amount due thereon? 
22. Was it reversible error for the District Court to make findings with respect to 
the knowledge and skill of JMS and to attribute a level of sophistication, expertise and 
skill to JMS based upon the quality of the presentation of JMS' counsel? 
Issues Nos. 10-22 above all preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs/Appellants' Closing 
Arguments, post-trial Supplemental and Reply briefs, and Objections to Defendants' 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Proposed Order. R. 4194-4307, 
4425-4444, 5380, 5381, 4557-4598. 
23. Was it reversible error for the District Court to issue the ex parte charging 
order without notice and without hearing? 
Preserved for appeal R. 5068. 
24. Was it reversible error for the District Court to allow the opposing party to 
designate the representative to testify in supplemental proceedings on behalf of limited 
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liability companies who are the judgment debtors, where the limited liability companies 
objected to such designation, scope of inquiry and document production, and where 
allowing opposing parties to designate representatives of limited liability entities to testify 
was and is not contemplated by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
Preserved for appeal R. 4807j 4819. 
25. Was it reversible error for the District Court to require Mr. Rosen to appear 
and to testify at a deposition in supplemental proceedings without the required 14 day 
notice provided for under Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where the 
opposing party had not made a motion to shorten the time period, nor provided an 
affidavit demonstrating good cause in support of a motion to shorten the time period? 
Preserved for appeal R. 4807,4819. 
26. Was it reversible error for the District Court to require Mr. Rosen to produce 
documents and to testify as to the business affairs of non-parties to the litigation where 
Mr. Rosen was not appearing on behalf of those entities and affirmatively indicated that 
the documents requested were either not in his possession and/or control in the capacity in 
which he was appearing, and that the prior ruling of the Court did not require him to 
produce said documents? 
Preserved for appeal R. 4807,4819. 
27. Was it reversible error for the District Court to require the judgment debtors to 
appear through an individual of the opposing parties' choosing to produce documents 
regarding the private business affairs of non parties to the litigation and for the District 
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Court to find said parties' in contempt and to sanction them for the designee's failure to 
provide the documents and information requested and to conclude that Harold Rosen and 
JMS-Financial and JMS-Hidden had failed to comply with the previous orders of the 
Court, and sanction them in the amount of $500.00, without conducting an evidentiary 
hearing as requested by counsel and without reviewing or entering into evidence any 
portion of the deposition transcript? 
Preserved for appeal R. 5384. 
28. Was it reversible error for the District Court to exercise jurisdiction over non-
parties to the litigation by ordering Mr. Rosen to appear and to testify concerning those 
entities private financial affairs and business dealings, where said entities were not parties 
to the case and were not served with notice? 
Preserved for appeal R. 4807, 4819, 5384. 
29. Was it reversible error for the District Court to exercise jurisdiction and enter 
an injunction against Aspenwood, L.L.C., where Aspenwood was not a judgment debtor 
and was no longer a party to the case, and for the Court to force Aspenwood to declare a 
distribution to its members following the payment of its legitimate debts? 
Preserved for Appeal R. 5385. 
30. Was it reversible error for the District Court to exercise jurisdiction over 
Aspenwood, L.L.C., and to require Aspenwood to give written notice of all debts to be 
paid, allow opposing counsel an opportunity to review and object to any proposed 
payment of debt, and to purport to exercise jurisdiction to determine the validity of any 
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proposed debt, where Aspenwood was not a judgment debtor and was no longer a party to 
the case? 
Preserved for Appeal R. 5385. 
31. Was it reversible error for the District Court to enter an injunction against 
Aspenwood, L.L.C. on the basis that "JMS Financial's actions have demonstrated they 
may well attempt to dissipate or encumber the Funds to evade the Judgment entered in 
favor of CAT absent an injunction", where there was no evidentiary basis to support such 
a finding? 
Preserved for Appeal R. 5385. 
32. Was it reversible error for the District Court to leave Writs of Garnishment 
and Execution in place where Garnishees requested but were never afforded a hearing? 
Preserved for Appeal R. 5068. 
APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following are the applicable standards of review: 
1. For findings of fact conclusions of law, and mixed questions of law and fact; 
"...this court will review the lower court's findings of fact under the clearly 
erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a correctness standard. With respect 
to mixed questions of law and fact, we will review the underlying facts under the 
deferential clear error standard; however, the legal effect of those facts is within the 
province of the appellate court, and no deference need be given a [lower] court's 
resolution of such questions of law." McKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998). 
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2. For Summary Judgment rulings; 
[W]e review the trial court's summary judgment rulings for correctness. Aurora 
Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998); Certified 
Sur. Group, Ltd. v. UTInc, 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998). "We consider only 
whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed 
issues of material fact existed." Aurora Credit Servs., 970 P.2d at 1277. This is the 
standard of review we apply because summary judgment is appropriate only "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Surety 
Underwriters v. E& C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338, (Utah 2000), citing Tretheway v. 
Miracle Mortgage, Inc., 995 P.2d 599 (Utah 2000); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 
P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
3. For a Judge reiving on independent recollection and becoming witnesses; 
It is inappropriate for a judge to rely on his independent recollection and 
essentially become a witness in the determination of a factual matter. "The trial judge 
seemed to rely on his independent recollection of the pre-settlement hearing to interpret 
the ambiguity in the settlement order. This is clearly inappropriate." Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah App. 1988); see Carr v. Bradshaw Chevrolet 
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Ca, 464 P.2d 580, 581 (1970). 
4. For a trial court's legal conclusions and findings of fact: 
Upon review, a trial court's legal conclusions are given no deference, but are 
reviewed for correctness. Estate of Knickerbocker, In re, 912 P.2d 969, (Utah 1996). 
With respect to a trial court's findings of fact, "[W]e initially note that we will not 
overturn findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the great weight of 
evidence or if we are otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been 
made." Estate of Knickerbocker, In re, 912 P.2d 969, 977 (Utah 1996); Utah RXiv.P. 
52(a). 
5. For questions of law; 
Questions of law are reviewed under a correction of error standard. 
State v.Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997). 
6. For a Court's exercise of jurisdiction; 
"[T]he propriety of the judicial determination....becomes a question of law upon 
which we do not defer to the district court." Classic Cabinets, Inc., v. All American Life 
Ins. Co. 978 P.2d 465, 467-68 (Utah App. 1999). Further, The question of whether a court 
has jurisdiction "goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action." Rimensburger 
v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah App. 1992) citing Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 
726(UtahApp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellant Aspenwood, L.L.C. is a limited liability company which was 
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formed in the Spring of 1997 by Dan Mehr, Paul Taggart and John Coats to purchase and 
develop certain real estate projects as described below. Dan Mehr owned an excavation 
company, Baucorp, which had done work on at least one real estate project for Taggart and 
Coats prior to 1997. Taggart was a real estate developer with over twenty-five years of 
experience. Coats is a dentist/investor who had been involved in a project with Taggart 
prior to 1997, and who had done other projects without Taggart. Coats had invested money 
in certain other projects which Mehr had been involved in, independent of Taggart, prior to 
1997. 
Mehr learned that another developer, Kent Hoggan, had several large real estate 
projects which Hoggan might be willing to sell off. Mehr had no money, and went to 
Taggart and Coats to see if they would be interested in helping Mehr purchase and develop 
some of these Hoggan projects. Taggart and Coats understood that Mehr was looking to 
them to provide the funding for the purchase and development of any projects which they 
jointly decided to pursue. 
Mehr and Taggart met with Hoggan and went through a list of various projects that 
Hoggan might be willing to sell. They negotiated purchase prices for each project, and 
terms of purchase for them all. A Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "Newport REPC", a 
copy of which is found in Addendum 2) was prepared and signed by Baucorp, on behalf of 
Mehr, Taggart and Coats, jointly, to purchase certain projects for $8.1 million and 
assumption of underlying debt - and Taggart gave Hoggan a check for $100,000.00. Taggart 
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< 
met with Hoggan and began extensive due diligence on the projects. Taggart bragged about 
how good he was at doing due diligence, and how experienced he was. 
One of the projects was owned, fifty percent, by Lonnie Oman - the Hidden Ridge 
project in Springville, Utah in which the other plaintiff/Appellant JMS-Hidden obtained 
i 
an interest over a year later. The Newport REPC only covered Hoggan's fifty percent 
interest in Hidden Ridge. To buy the whole project, Oman would need to be contacted 
and a joint purchase worked out. Taggart met with Oman to go over the details of this < 
Hidden Ridge project, and received a package of documents from Oman. Oman offered 
to provide Taggart with any information that Taggart wanted about the Hidden Ridge 
project. 
Taggart continued to do his due diligence and reported to Mehr and Coats that five of 
the Hoggan projects were good, economically viable projects (one of which was Hidden 
Ridge) and that they should proceed with them, but that two were not. The tliree discussed 
them and decided to proceed with the five projects. Mehr agreed to oversee the day to day < 
work, and to contract to provide excavation services to Aspenwood on the various projects. 
Taggart and Coats agreed to provide the funding to purchase and develop the projects which 
had been determined to be attractive and worth pursuing. 
Because of the involvement of Oman in the Hidden Ridge project, a separate 
purchase agreement for that project alone was negotiated for the purchase of the whole 
100% interest. On the day that this Hidden Ridge sales agreement was signed, Taggart, 
Coats and Mehr formed Aspenwood, L.L.C. to be the formal entity through which Hidden i 
-20-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ridge and the other Hoggan projects would be purchased. Mehr took his fifty percent 
interest in Aspenwood in the name of Baucorp, rather than his own personal name. 
Taggart and Coats took their fifty percent interest in the name of C.A.T., L.L.C., a limited 
liability company which they owned, fifty/fifty. 
Unbeknownst to Mehr, in agreeing to provide the funding for the five Hoggan 
projects, Taggart and Coats had made certain assumptions about when they would receive 
monies from other projects, and when they could expect to receive monies from sales of 
lots in the Hidden Ridge project. Based upon these assumptions, Taggart and Coats had 
apparently felt comfortable agreeing to fund all of these projects. 
Unfortunately, Taggart and Coats' assumptions about when and how much money 
they would receive turned out to be inaccurate. Consequently, when monies came due on 
the Hidden Ridge agreement and the Newport REPC, they did not have the money to 
advance to Aspenwood to make these payments. Rather than simply own up to their 
mistaken financial projections, Taggart falsely accused Hoggan of fraud in an attempt to 
stall for time to get money from other sources to make the required payments for the 
projects. Why? Because Taggart knew that the Hoggan projects which they had agreed 
after the formation of Aspenwood to pursue were all good, economically viable (i.e., 
highly profitable) projects and he did not want to lose them. 
Because Aspenwood was not able to make payments on the underlying debt for the 
various projects, including the Hidden Ridge project, Hoggan had to step back in and start 
making payments on this debt. Hoggan waited for a while, but then declared a default 
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under the Newport REPC and the Hidden Ridge agreement. Taggart then made no 
attempts to keep the non-Hidden Ridge projects, and Aspenwood lost them completely. 
Aspenwood's part of this lawsuit was over the failure of Taggart and Coats, through 
CAT, to provide the funding which had been agreed upon to purchase and develop the 
four non-Hidden Ridge projects. The projected profits from these four projects, as per 
Taggart's own analysis, was at least $10,000,000.00. 
As indicated below, Judge Bohling granted summary judgment dismissing 
Aspenwood's claims against CAT, Taggart and Coats. Aspenwood is appealing the 
granting of summary judgment on these issues because it believes that the record will 
show that there were numerous key issues of material fact in dispute which precluded 
summary judgment, and that Judge Bohling's interpretation of the Aspenwood operating 
agreement was as a matter of law incorrect. 
Meanwhile, after doing months of due diligence, Taggart and Coats agreed to 
personally guarantee a bank loan in the approximate amount of $2.5 million dollars to 
complete the purchase of Phase 1 of Hidden Ridge, and to provide the funds to pay for the 
development of Phase I into saleable building lots (put in sewer, water, utilities, curb and 
gutter, roads, lighting, etc.). This loan closed in August of 1997. Actual construction 
of improvements did not really begin until the Spring of 1998. Taggart oversaw Mehr's 
work and efforts on the project like a hawk. He reviewed all draw requests. He asked 
detailed questions about what was going on. He received reports from Mehr, and he 
visited the site. Taggart was, as a result, intimately aware of what was going on at 
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Hidden Ridge. Taggart was also involved in the effort to sell lots. By the 
Spring/Summer of 1998, most (80) of the 92 lots in Phase 1 had been presold. The main 
buyers were Americraft and Russell/Packard. But these builders were expecting the lots 
to be finished so that they could build and sell homes on them during the Summer of 
1998. 
Unfortunately, development work was slow and not nearing completion until the 
Fall of 1998. But, more importantly, a five (5) mile long major sewer line, and a shorter 
water line, to service the project had to both be built and brought to the project. When 
these onsite, and offsite, improvements were delayed during the Summer of 1998, the 
builders/buyers of lots expressed great dissatisfaction to Mehr and Taggart - threatening 
to cancel their contracts to purchase lots. 
Also of great concern was the fact that the Bank Loan funds were running out and 
there were still many hundreds of thousands of dollars of work to be finished and/or paid 
for before the subdivision would be done. By September of 1998, the Bank Loan was 
exhausted and Taggart and Coats refused to come up with any more money for 
Aspenwood. Mehr sent capital calls to Taggart and Coats and CAT from Aspenwood, 
but they were ignored. 
Mehr met with Taggart to prepare financial information to be given to the Bank 
and to possible third-party investors/lenders in an effort to get more money to pay for the 
completion of the project. Taggart visited the site and inspected the improvements. The 
underground sewer and water lines and storm drain system were in. The curb and gutter 
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was done. Mehr had put in asphalt on most of the roads. To the untrained eye, the 
subdivision looked complete. But Taggart and Mehr talked in detail about what was not 
complete and how much it would cost to fully finish the project. Taggart was an 
experienced developer and he knew what needed to be done and how much it would cost. 
i 
Taggart and Coats asked Mehr to go out and look for investors/lenders for Aspenwood. 
They knew and expected Mehr to approach and try and convince individuals to invest in 
and/or lend to Aspenwood. Mehr was desperate to get new money into the project because < 
he had approximately $300,000.00 in bills coming due for the work that he had performed 
on the project which he - Baucorp - could not pay. Taggart and Coats were desperate to get 
new money into the project because the Bank Loan would soon be in default and they were 
personally liable for all $2.5 million of it. 
In the meantime, Hal Rosen and Brian Steffensen in August of 1998 had met Pam 
and Brent Watson and made a high interest, or hard-money, loan to a client of the 
Watsons. Prior to August, 1998, neither Steffensen nor Rosen had ever made any such < 
loans. The Watsons had begun doing so sometime in the Summer of 1998. Neither the 
Watsons, nor Steffensen or Rosen had ever been involved in residential real estate 
development. 
In August or September of 1998, Mehr approached the Watsons, Steffensen and 
Rosen about providing funds to purchase a real estate project in West Valley City - the 
Meadowlands project. Negotiations began, and by late September of October of 1998, an 
agreement to purchase the Meadowlands project had been completed. The Watsons, < 
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Steffensen and Rosen formed JMS Financial, L.L.C. ("JMS") to be the entity through 
which they would own their interests, and through which they would lend funds to the 
Meadowlands project. Mehr and JMS also agreed to form an entity to purchase a second 
project in Harrisville, north of Ogden, about a month later. 
In late October, Mehr began telling the JMS people about the Hidden Ridge 
project. The Watsons were not very interested, and Rosen was going out of the Country 
for the first two weeks of November. When Rosen returned, JMS decided to let Rosen 
talk to Mehr about Hidden Ridge. Mehr faxed to Rosen a pro forma for the project on 
November 20, 1998. Rosen and Mehr then had a first meeting. Rosen took the 
information given to him by Mehr and started making his own spread sheet for the project 
to be used to try and decide whether JMS should proceed with any involvement in Hidden 
Ridge. 
Mehr told Rosen that Hidden Ridge was virtually complete and that there were 
some past due bills that needed to be paid. Mehr told Rosen that there was some minor 
work that still needed to be done, but that buyers were in place for most of the lots, and 
that if the improvements could be funded and completed quickly, lot closings would start 
immediately and most of the subdivision would be sold off completely by about April of 
1999. 
Rosen tried to be vary careful to ask detailed questions about certain key areas: 
1. Sales - what was sold, for how much, and when would the sales close (this 
determined the cash flow); 
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{ 
2. The status of improvements - what needed to be done to finish the project; and 
3, The bills due, the loans outstanding, and the costs of finishing the 
improvements. 
JMS had only about $200,000 to $300,000 available, and needed to get that money 
back by March of 1999. JMS projected that if it agreed to advance money to the Hidden { 
Ridge project, JMS would need that money back by March of 1999 so that it could be used 
to pay bills which were projected to come due on the Meadowlands project by then. 
Mehr and Rosen went back and forth for several weeks on Rosen's pro forma. Rosen 
told JMS that he believed from the pro forma that he had developed with Mehr that the 
project would only need $200,000.00 in cash, that sales were projected to start 
immediately and be essentially sold out during the Spring of 1999 such that JMS would 
not have to put any more money in than $200,000.00, and would get that money back by
 i 
March of 1999. 
The Watsons wanted to meet with Taggart and verify everything that Mehr had 
i 
told Rosen about Hidden Ridge. Taggart agreed to meet. Taggart remembered the 
meeting occurring "around Thanksgiving." Rosen and the Watsons, supported by their 
notes and day timers, testified that the meeting took place December 10, 1998. Rosen, the 
Watsons and Mehr himself testified that Mehr was not in the meeting. Taggart insisted 
that Mehr was there, and tried to shift blame for everything told to JMS to Mehr.
 { 
The meeting lasted over two hours. Taggart admitted that he was asked detailed 
questions about the project, about sales, prices, work that needed to be done, the cost to 
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complete the work, the timing of lot closings. Taggart admitted that he independently 
confirmed all of the information that Mehr had given to Rosen and JMS. Taggart said 
that he and Mehr "had gotten their arms around" the project, that there were "no more 
surprises" and that it was virtually complete. From what Taggart said and confirmed, the 
project looked really good to JMS and financially positive. 
Rosen prepared a final pro forma after the Taggart meeting, which became Exhibit 
38. Rosen used this pro forma, and the information thereon, to describe at trial what had 
been represented by Mehr and Taggart to be the facts with respect to the project. It showed 
costs, lot sales amounts, timing of closings, and the like. Rosen testified that the Exhibit 
38 pro forma was in essence, the "minutes" of the meeting with Taggart. A copy of this 
Exhibit 38 is attached hereto as Addendum 3. 
In reliance upon the representations made by Taggart directly, and on his and CAT's 
behalf by Mehr, about the Hidden Ridge project, JMS agreed to purchase CAT's 
membership interest in Aspenwood. A written agreement in this regard was signed on 
December 17, 1998. JMS then began advancing funds to Aspenwood in CAT's place to 
finish the project. 
Unfortunately, almost nothing which had been represented to be true about the 
project turned out to be true. Contrary to Taggart's express warranty that there were "no 
more surprises," more work needed to be done than Taggart had represented. Contrary 
to Taggart's representations, there were hundreds of thousands of dollars in extra costs. 
The lot sales did not close when represented. And many other representations turned out 
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not to be true. 
The issues at trial were whether Taggart and CAT had made any representations or 
warranties to JMS? Did Taggart and CAT fail to disclose any material information about 
the project to JMS? Were any of the representations or warranties untrue or false? Were 
they made negligently? Were they made recklessly or intentionally /knowingly? What, if 
any, were JMS' damages arising therefrom? As to CAT's counterclaim, the issue was 
whether JMS breached the agreement, and if so, how much did JMS owe to CAT. 
As will be explained in detail hereafter, Plaintiff/Appellant JMS believes that the 
evidence adduced at trial was UNDISPUTED that there were express representations and 
warranties made about the project made and/or expressly confirmed to JMS by Taggart, on 
behalf of CAT; that there were numerous material facts which were omitted and 
not disclosed to JMS; and that these representations turned out not to be true. Yet, Judge 
Bohling ignored this undisputed evidence and ruled in CAT's favor. JMS appeals the 
inaccurate findings of fact, and incorrect conclusions of law based thereon. 
Even if the Appellate Court were inclined to affirm Judge Bohling's findings and 
conclusions, the case should have been tried to a jury and not to Judge Bohling. Further, 
Appellants believe that they were improperly and unconstitutionally precluded from being 
able to fully and fairly conduct discovery and prepare for trial herein. On either or both 
of these grounds, the trial court's rulings should be vacated, the appellants afforded a full 
and fair opportunity to conduct their discovery and prepare for trial, and that trial should 
be had before a jury as was requested and paid for. 
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Finally, the appellants believe that Judge Bohling issued a series of improper and 
unwarranted rulings after the trial in connection with CAT's attempts to collect its judgment 
which should be reversed. In this regard, the following is relevant. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants filed their Complaint against Defendants/Appellees (hereinafter 
referred to as "CAT") on November 5, 1999. In early 2000, a discovery dispute arose 
which resulted in JMS filing motions to compel and for sanctions. A hearing in Judge 
Bohling's chambers was held on April 18, 2000, regarding the discovery dispute. The 
hearing was held off the record. Following this hearing, an Order was signed on May 30, 
2000 by the Court which imposed a strict order on the taking of depositions. The order 
held that depositions of the parties and their principal members were to be completed 
prior to the taking of any third party depositions. 
At the April 18, 2000 hearing, the Court, sua sponte decided to create a scheduling 
order. The scheduling order imposed a discovery cut-off date of October 13, 2000. The 
strict order of depositions imposed by the Court made it impossible for JMS to take any 
third party depositions prior to the initial discovery cut-off. CAT's witnesses were made 
available to JMS in August, 2000. CAT took their first deposition on August 29, 2000. 
The initial deposition of the final JMS principal was not taken by CAT until October 9, 
2000. Faced with an impending discovery cut-off, the parties agreed to a continuance to 
take certain depositions. However, it became apparent that it would be impossible to 
complete the discovery needed prior to the date agreed upon by the parties. It also became 
apparent that there were other individuals who would need to be deposed. JMS moved for 
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a continuance of the trial date and for additional time to conduct discovery. 
On November 9, 2000, the discovery deadline and trial dates were continued; 
however, JMS was inappropriately prohibited from taking any depositions other than 
those which the parties had supposedly agreed to take as a result of their prior stipulation. \ 
In essence, JMS was improperly denied the ability to take depositions of necessary third 
parties. 
CAT moved for summary judgment in October, 2000, prior to the time discovery 
had been completed. JMS moved for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f) to complete 
discovery. Despite the fact that discovery was far from complete, the Rule 56(f) motion 
was denied. The Court held two hearings and subsequently entered partial summary 
judgment in favor of CAT. JMS contends that the denial of the Rule 56(f) motion and 
the subsequent rulings on partial summary judgment were improper. The Court applied 
an erroneous standard in considering whether or not there were disputed issues of 
material fact, improperly weighed evidence, failed to consider evidence on record, 
decided disputed questions of fact in order to reach legal conclusions on which the 
summary judgment was based, etc. 
As previously indicated, JMS had requested and paid for a jury trial. The Court 
claims that JMS waived their right to a jury trial. This waiver supposedly occurred on 
April 18, 2000, during the off-record hearing which resulted in the initial scheduling 
order. JMS never waived its right to jury trial. Nevertheless, JMS was denied a jury and 
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their case was tried to the Court. 
Following the completion of the limited discovery that JMS was allowed to take, 
the case was tried to the Court in April, 2001. Following the trial, the Court made certain 
findings, which were not supported by the evidence, and requested additional argument 
on the issue of fraud. Additional argument was held, and the Court subsequently entered 
its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and entered judgment on June 28, 20001. JMS 
contends that certain findings of the Court, as well as the conclusions of law drawn 
therefrom, were improper. 
Following the commencement of appellate proceedings, CAT commenced 
collection and execution proceedings. The Judgment debtors are JMS-Hidden, L.L.C, 
and JMS-Financial, L.L.C. Following entry of Judgment, CAT obtained an Order in 
Supplemental Proceedings dated July 6, 2001. 
The Order in Supplemental Proceedings purported to require JMS-Hidden, and JMS-
Financial, "through Harold Rosen to be examined concerning their assets, liabilities and 
financial affairs" before a court reporter on July 13, 2001 at the offices of CAT's counsel. 
The Order in Supplemental Proceedings further ordered Mr. Rosen to bring with him for 
copying and inspection "(1) all financial statements, profit and loss statements, balance 
sheets, income statements, general ledgers of JMS-Hidden, L.L.C, JMS-Financial, L.L.C, 
JMS-Meadow, L.L.C. and JMS-Brook, L.L.C; (2) all agreements, notes, Trust Deeds, 
and/or security agreements between JMS-Meadow, L.L.C. and Scott R. Turville and/or the 
Monte Cannon Nelson Trust and David M. Nelson and/or City Properties, L.L.C. relating 
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( 
to the Meadowlands project in West Valley City, Utah; and (3) all other documents 
necessary to identify the assets and liabilities of said entities and any liens or 
encumbrances against the assets of said entities, including the amount thereof." 
CAT served a copy of the Order in Supplemental Proceedings along with a Subpoena 
Duces Tecum to Harold Rosen on the evening of July 6, 2001. The scheduled examination 
was July 13, 2001. Mr. Rosen was going to be in Wyoming on the 13th of July, and the 
Subpoena Duces Tecum failed to give Mr. Rosen 14 days notice as required under Rule 45 ( 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, on July 12, 2001 Mr. Rosen filed a 
Motion for Protective Order and a Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum. Appellants 
contend that Mr. Rosen was served in a personal capacity. The Order in Supplemental 
Proceedings was never served upon JMS-Hidden or JMS-Financial. In addition to the fact 
that the Order in Supplemental Proceedings was not served on JMS-Financial or JMS-
Hidden, and the Order also sought to order the judgment debtors (via Mr. Rosen) to testify 
concerning the assets and liabilities of entities which were not judgment debtors or even < 
parties to the action, CAT caused an additional Motion to Set Aside Order in Supplemental 
Proceedings to be filed. These motions were heard by the Court on July 19, 2001. 
The Court held that despite the fact that the Subpoena Duces Tecum had been served 
on "Harold Rosen" and had not been served upon the registered agent or the managing entity 
of JMS-Financial or JMS-Hidden, service on Mr. Rosen personally was the equivalent of 
service upon JMS-Financial and JMS-Hidden, the judgment debtors. The Court also found 
that service was proper and no order shortening the time for Rosen's examination was 
-32-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
necessary, despite the fact that no request for such an order, let alone a showing of good 
cause for such an order, had been made. Rather than grant Mr. Rosen 14 days from the date 
of the hearing to prepare for the deposition, the Court ordered Mr. Rosen to appear on July 
30, 2001. Without entering any evidence into the record in support of such a conclusion, 
the Court stated that even if an order to shorten the time was necessary, "good cause existed 
to shorten the time because of the actions that JMS has undertaken to encumber its assets 
since the Court announced its ruling on June 1, 2001." 
The Court did modify the order in Supplemental Proceedings to some extent with 
respect to the documents which Mr. Rosen was required to bring with him. The order 
was directed to JMS, but required Mr. Rosen to appear to testify on behalf of JMS. The 
order indicated that if Rosen did not have documents pertaining to the non-parties JMS-
Meadow, L.L.C. ("JMS-Meadow") and JMS-Brook, L.L.C. ("JMS-Brook") "in his 
capacity as president of J.D. West, which is a member of JMS-Financial, and JMS 
itself do not have in their possession records concerning the business of JMS-Meadows, 
L.L.C. and JMS-Brook, L.L.C, such documents are not required to be produced at the 
examination." 
Rosen subsequently appeared without counsel (contrary to his counsel's wishes) on 
July 30, 2001 and provided CAT with the documents in his possession which related to the 
business affairs of the judgment debtors, JMS-Hidden and JMS-Financial. In addition to 
providing all of the recent and updated information he had concerning the judgment debtors, 
Rosen also provided some information regarding the affairs of JMS-Meadow, JMS-Brook 
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and Aspenwood, L.L.C. Rosen fully and in good faith complied with the order and the 
rulings of the Court as given on July 19, 2001, and even provided information beyond that 
which the Court had required rosen to give. 
However, CAT wanted Mr. Rosen to testify as to the internal affairs and private 
dealings of Aspenwood, JMS-Meadow, and JMS-Brook. Despite the badgering of CAT's 
counsel, Mr. Rosen insisted that he was not prepared to testify for those entities who 
were not judgment debtors or parties to the action and the supplemental proceedings < 
thereon. CAT subsequently moved for an Order to Show Cause. 
At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, which was held on August 21, 2001, 
CAT misrepresented to the Court by proffer of counsel the facts surrounding the taking 
of Rosen's deposition. A transcript of the deposition proceedings was not placed into 
evidence. Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants vigorously argued to the Court that Mr. Rosen 
had fully complied with the Court's order of the Court, and even read back to the Court the 
specific language of the July 19, 2001 order. Additionally, counsel pointed out that there i 
was no evidentiary basis to hold Mr. Rosen in contempt or to otherwise sanction the JMS 
entities, because there had been no proper evidence entered into the record to support any 
such finding, other than the testimony of defendants' counsel, Mr. Mitchell. Counsel also 
offered to read portions of the unsigned transcript of Rosen's deposition into the record at 
that time to demonstrate irrefutably that Rosen had in fact fully complied with the Court's 
order. Counsel for plaintiffs/appellants also requested an evidentiary hearing on the matter, 
and requested the Court to recess the proceedings so that a full evidentiary hearing could be i 
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held. At that time, Mr. Rosen had not even had an opportunity to review the deposition 
transcript. 
Without so much as looking at the transcript, the Court expressed "outrage" at 
counsel and Mr. Rosen and found Mr. Rosen and the JMS entities had failed to comply 
with the previous orders of the Court. Rosen and the judgment debtors were sanctioned, 
and Rosen was ordered to appear and "answer the questions that are asked" with no 
reference to the Court's earlier limitations on the scope of inquiry into the private 
business affairs of the non-parties and non-judgment debtors, JMS-Meadow, JMS-Brook, 
and Aspenwood, L.L.C. Appellants filed a notice of appeal three days following the 
ruling of the Court. 
In addition to the above, CAT sought and obtained ex parte an improper charging 
order charging the interest of JMS-Hidden, L.L.C. with payment of the judgment. 
CAT also sought an injunction against Aspenwood, L.L.C. The motion for preliminary 
injunction was heard on August 1, 2001. 
Aspenwood, L.L.C. is not a judgment debtor. However, the Court entered an order 
which amounted to placing Aspenwood into a de facto receivership and prevented 
Aspenwood from paying any of its debts without prior approval of either CAT's counsel 
or the Court. The Court indicated that if CAT's counsel objected to the payment of any 
particular debt, then the matter would be set for hearing and the Court would determine 
whether the debt was to be paid. The Court did not have the right to exercise control over 
the private business affairs of Aspenwood and purport to exercise authority to determine 
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which debts Aspenwood could or could not pay. Further, the order declaring that a 
distribution be made exceeded the powers of the Court. Aspenwood was no longer a 
party to the action, its claims having been dismissed via summary judgment. Further, 
there was no judgment against Aspenwood. 
CAT also served Interrogatories to certain Garnishees who answered them and 
requested a hearing. A hearing was never granted but the writs remained in place. 
On September 10, 2001, the Plaintiffs /Appellants filed motions to stay the execution * 
proceedings pending appeal, for a protective order and a motion to recuse Judge Bohling. 
Judge David Burton signed an order recusing Judge Bohling on or about March 4, 2002. 
The remaining motions have not yet been determined and the case has not yet been 
assigned to another judge. CAT filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ with this Court on 
< 
or about March 6, 2002 seeking to set aside Judge Burton's Order recusing Judge Bohling. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Dan Mehr is a contractor. Paul Taggart is a real estate developer. John Coats is an i 
endodontist. Dan Mehr had first become involved with Paul Taggart and John Coats 
as a contractor working on the improvements for the Brook Hollow project of which, 
Taggart and Coats were both members. (R. 4148, at p. 49-60) Taggart described his 
experience with Mehr as "very positive." (Id. at p. 60) Coats said his experience 
I 
working with Dan Mehr was positive and that he was not aware of any complaints 
regarding Mr. Mehr's work. (R. 4141, p. 38-39) 
i 
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2. In the spring of 1997, Mehr became aware that Kent Hoggan had various real estate 
development projects which he was willing to sell. The projects were located in 
Woods Cross, West Valley, North Ogden, Roy, Springville, Willard, Grantsville, 
Clearfield, as well as a project known as Highland Oaks Phase II. (R. 818-827) 
3. Kent Hoggan informed Mehr that with respect to the property located in Springville, 
he had a partner named Lonnie Oman who was a 50% owner in the project. In March of 
1997 Mehr offered to purchase Mr. Oman's 50% interest in the Hidden Ridge project. 
However, Mr. Oman indicated he did not want to sell his interest in the project. (Id. at 818-
827.) 
4. Having worked previously with Taggart and Coats in connection with the real estate 
project known as Brook Hollow, and knowing that Taggart was an experienced real estate 
developer, Mehr approached Taggart and asked him if he would be interested in developing 
certain projects which Mehr believed could be acquired from Kent Hoggan and Hoggan's 
company, Newport Holdings. (Id. at 818-827) 
5. Mehr approached Taggart because Mehr did not have sufficient money to pursue and 
develop the various projects which Kent Hoggan was willing to sell. (Id. at 818-827) 
6. Taggart told Mehr that he was interested in pursuing the projects and indicated that he 
would also bring in Coats as an investor. (R. at 818-827) 
8. Taggart set up a meeting, and in April of 1997, Mehr, Taggart and Coats met and 
discussed the various projects which were being offered by Kent Hoggan. (R. at 818-827) 
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( 
9. Mehr, Taggart and Coats met together at least two times in early April, 1997 to 
discuss the projects being offered by Hoggan. However, Mehr and Taggart had several 
additional meetings and numerous communications wherein they discussed the development 
potential of the real estate projects being offered by Hoggan. Several days prior to April 24, 
1997 Taggart and Mehr met with Hoggan to discuss the real estate projects, their various 
stages of development, and their profit potential. They also discussed terms upon which to 
acquire these projects.(R. at 818-827) * 
10. Taggart testified that on April 23, 1997, Taggart, Mehr and Coats met at Coats' 
cottage to discuss the projects. Taggart and Coats agreed to put up the money to acquire the . 
projects and also the money to finance their development if the results of the due diligence 
demonstrated that they were good projects. (R. 5388 at p. 88 and 90) 
11. Several days later Kent Hoggan drafted a real estate purchase contract (the "Newport 
REPC") and an additional meeting took place involving Mehr, Taggart and Hoggan to 
execute the agreement. (R. 818-827. A copy of the Newport REPC attached as * 
Addendum 2). 
12. The Newport REPC was signed on April 24, 1997. Mehr signed the document, . 
which had been drafted as being between "Baucorp or it's assignees" and Newport. 
Baucorp, Inc., was Mehr's construction company. At the time that the Newport REPC was 
executed, Mehr testified that he understood that the agreement was being executed for the 
benefit of the partnership involving Mehr, Taggart and Coats. (R. 818-827) 
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9. Mehr, Taggart and Coats met together at least two times in early April, 1997 to 
discuss the projects being offered by Hoggan. However, Mehr and Taggart had several 
additional meetings and numerous communications wherein they discussed the development 
potential of the real estate projects being offered by Hoggan. Several days prior to April 24, 
1997 Taggart and Mehr met with Hoggan to discuss the real estate projects, their various 
stages of development, and their profit potential. They also discussed terms upon which to 
acquire these projects.(R. at 818-827) 
10. Taggart testified that on April 23, 1997, Taggart, Mehr and Coats met at Coats' 
cottage to discuss the projects. Taggart and Coats agreed to put up the money to acquire the 
projects and also the money to finance their development if the results of the due diligence 
demonstrated that they were good projects. (R. 5388 at p. 88 and 90) 
11. Several days later Kent Hoggan drafted a real estate purchase contract (the "Newport 
REPC") and an additional meeting took place involving Mehr, Taggart and Hoggan to 
execute the agreement. (R. 818-827. A copy of the Newport REPC attached as 
Addendum 2). 
12. The Newport REPC was signed on April 24, 1997. Mehr signed the document, 
which had been drafted as being between "Baucorp or it's assignees" and Newport. 
Baucorp, Inc., was Mehr's construction company. At the time that the Newport REPC was 
executed, Mehr testified that he understood that the agreement was being executed for the 
benefit of the partnership involving Mehr, Taggart and Coats. (R. 818-827) 
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13. Taggart gave Hoggan a check for $100,000.00 on April 24, 1997 at the signing of the 
Newport REPC. (R. 5377 at 49 ) 
14. The Newport REPC called for a total purchase price of 8.1 million dollars to be paid 
initially in monthly payments of $100,000.00 beginning April 24, 1997, and $100,000.00 
each month thereafter for nine months. The balance of the total purchase price was to be 
amortized and paid thereafter in equal monthly installments over ten years. Interest would be 
calculated at the rate of 4% per annum beginning on June L 1998 on the remaining balance < 
and would be paid with the monthly installments. The cost for each of the projects being 
conveyed under the Newport REPC was as follows:Woods Cross $900,000.00;West Valley, 
$600,000.00; N. Ogden, $300,000.00; Roy, $200,000.00; Springville, $800,000.00; Willard, 
$1,000,000.00; Grantsville,$2,800,000.00; Highland Oaks $1,000,000.00; Clearfield 
$500,000.00; Total:$8,100,000.00 (Newport REPC, Addendum 2; R. 4159) 
15. Shortly after the signing of the Newport REPC, Kent Hoggan drove Taggart to each 
of the projects except for Willard and Grantsville, to inspect the projects. Taggart took < 
notes, asked questions and did significant due diligence on the projects. Hoggan understood 
as of April, 1997, that Aspenwood had taken over the projects listed on the Newport REPC 
and that they were proceeding to do the development on the projects. He indicated that Paul 
Taggart had asked him questions concerning city council meetings on various projects, the 
stages of the projects, engineering requirements and payments due. Hoggan further testifies 
that because he was selling the projects it was his understanding that they were assuming all 
the underlying contracts and payment obligations. Hoggan testifies that prior to the fall of i 
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1997, he had "no question that they had taken the projects on and I was backing off. (R. 
5397 at p. 25-28 and 65) 
16. Between the execution of the Newport REPC on April 24, 1997 and May 22, 1997, 
Taggart compiled hundreds of pages of very detailed information regarding each of the 
projects acquired via the Newport REPC. Taggart himself confirmed doing due diligence 
during this time frame (R. 4148 at p. 154-157). 
17. Taggart also admits that the information he obtained was very detailed, and reveals he 
knew what the underlying contractual obligations were with respect to each one of the 
projects, when the payments were due to the underlying land owners, the development 
status, etc., and that he generated a form to obtain the information, which he himself 
described as "very specific" (R. 4148 at p. 165-167, R. 2171-2551) 
18. Following Taggart's due diligence, and prior to May 22, 1997, Taggart, Coats and 
Mehr held a meeting and agreed that they would pursue and develop the Clearfield, Woods 
Cross, West Valley, Springville, and Hidden Oaks Phase II projects. Coats and Taggart 
agreed to come up with the financing necessary to fund these developments.(R. 818-827, R. 
4157 at p. 169-173, R. 4148 at p. 176-177) 
19. One of the projects listed in the Newport REPC was 50% of the "Hidden Ridge" 
project in Springville, Utah. (Addendum 2) 
20. Following the execution of the Newport REPC, Mehr learned that Lonnie Oman 
("Oman") would be willing to sell his 50% interest in the project. However, Oman insisted 
upon drawing up a separate purchase agreement with respect to the Hidden Ridge project to 
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( 
include his interest. Mehr discussed obtaining the entire interest in the Hidden Ridge project 
with Coats and Taggart, and the three of them agreed that it would be more profitable to 
obtain all of the Hidden Ridge project and develop it themselves rather than only have 50% 
of the project and develop it jointly with Oman. (R. 818-827) 
21. On May 22, 1997, a purchase agreement entitled "Hidden Ridge Purchase 
Agreement" was executed. By virtue of this agreement, Aspenwood, LLC acquired 100% of 
the Hidden Ridge project. (R. 4159-4164) ( 
22. Upon execution of the purchase agreement, Taggart and Coats caused $250,000.00 to 
be paid to Oman and Hoggan. (R. 818-827) 
23. Aspenwood LLC (hereinafter "Aspenwood") was also organized on May 22, 1997. 
Mehr and Taggart were designated as executive managers of Aspenwood. Mehr chose to 
hold his interest in Aspenwood via his corporation "Baucorp." At the time the articles of 
organization were completed Mehr was informed that Taggart and Coats would hold their 
membership interest via an entity known as C.A.T., LLC ("CAT"). Prior to this date Mehr { 
had not been aware of any entity by that name. All of the agreements, meetings and 
discussions had been with Mehr, Taggart and Coats and it was Mehr's understanding that 
the agreements that had been entered into would be taken care of by them personally. Mehr 
did not object to them executing the obligations and agreements which they had entered into 
via some other entity for convenience sake, so long as they personally fulfilled their duties 
and obligations to finance and help develop the five projects that the parties had mutually 
decided to pursue. (R. 818-827) < 
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24. An "Operating Agreement of Aspenwood, L.L.C." (hereinafter "Operating 
Agreement") was also executed in connection with the formation of Aspenwood, on or about 
May 22, 1997. While paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 discuss funding obligations, there is no specific 
mention of any real estate projects to be developed. (R. 4159-4164) 
25. Mehr testified that it was always understood between Taggart, Coats and Mehr, that 
Mehr would not provide the funding for the development of the Clearfield, Woods Cross, 
West Valley, Springville or Highland Oaks projects (hereinafter referred to collectively as 
the "Newport Projects"), but that Mehr would construct and install the improvements 
thereto. (R. 818-827). 
26. Mehr testified that Taggart and Coats were responsible and had agreed, both before 
and after the execution of the Operating Agreement, to provide the financing for the 
development of the Newport Projects either individually or through investors or other 
means. Taggart and Coats conveyed to Mehr that they had sufficient capital either 
personally or through investors with which they were acquainted to provide adequate 
funding for the projects the three had chosen and designated to develop. (R. 818-827 at 167, 
150-179) 
27. Taggart and Coats did not provide the funding to Aspenwood which they had 
promised. Taggart and Coats failed to provide the funding necessary to keep current on the 
payments required under both the Newport REPC and the Hidden Ridge Purchase 
Agreement. Some payments were made in the months of June and July of 1997. In August, 
1997, Aspenwood closed on a development loan from U.S. Bank in the amount of 
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$2,531,000.00. Oman and Hoggan were paid a combined total of $223,874.00 from the 
development loan. No payments were made after August, 1997. (R. 4159-4164) 
28. Because Aspenwood had failed to pay the amounts required under the Newport 
REPC, and had failed to pay the amounts due on the underlying contracts, Hoggan had to 
"scramble to borrow hard money at 10 points and 18% interest to come in and save the 
projects," because the payments had not been made on the underlying obligations. (R. 5397 
atpp.28-30) 
28. On October 3, 1997, Hoggan wrote a letter indicating that the Newport REPC was in 
default. (R. 4159-4164) 
29. At the same time that Taggart was pursuing the Hidden Ridge and other projects 
outlined in the Newport REPC he was also involved in two developments known as Deer 
Mountain and Pilgrims' Landing. The Deer Mountain project consists of 429 acres of land 
on the Jordanelle on Highway 248. (R. 4148 at p. 69-71) 
30. Taggart indicates that his role in the Deer Mountain project consisted of finding an 
investor to put up 1.5 million dollars, perforin all the entitlement work and that he had 
"basically sole management of that project" as the manager of Deer Mountain, LLC. (R. 
4148 at p. 69-71) 
31. Taggart was the sole person responsible for doing the entitlements on the Deer 
Mountain project. (R. 4148 at p. 76) 
32. Taggart held an ownership interest in Deer Mountain LLC, through Ivory Court, 
LLC. (R. 4148 at p. 75) 
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33. At the same time that he was attempting to develop the Deer Mountain project, 
Taggart was also involved in the Pilgrims' Landing project consisting of 139 acres in Lehi. 
Taggart's initial involvement in the Pilgrims' Landing project was to bring in Jay Call of 
Flying J, John Miller and Larry Miller as partners to purchase 55 acres of the 
aforementioned property. Taggart had a written agreement with the aforementioned 
investors indicating that he was to do all the work related to the project, entitlements, 
improvements, sales necessary to sell it, and that there would be a profit sharing agreement 
among them for his efforts. (R. 4148 at p. 85-88) 
34. During the course of developing Pilgrims' Landing, Taggart created an additional 
entity known as Pilgrims' Landing LLC and raised an additional 3.7 million dollars to 
purchase the remaining 84 acres of the Pilgrims' Landing project. Similarly, Taggart had a 
contract for management services and profit sharing and was in essence the sole person 
responsible for developing the Pilgrims' Landing project. (R. 4148 at p. 69-71) 
35. Taggart indicates that during the time period in which he was involved with the Deer 
Mountain and the Pilgrims' Landing projects, those two projects "dominated" his time. 
Taggart's testimony was that during the time he was involved with the Deer Mountain 
project he spent 40-50% of his time working on that one project alone. He also indicates 
that 40-45% of his time was spent on the Pilgrims' Landing project, so that between the two 
of them they occupied up to 95% of his time. (R. 4148 at p. 82-102) 
36. Taggart also testified that despite the fact that he'd been working on the very large 
and very time consuming Deer Mountain and Pilgrims' Landing projects, as of the fall of 
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1998 he had not received a substantial payday for 18 months, and was in serious need of 
funds. (R. 4148 at p. 82-84) 
37. Taggart testified that in the fall of 1997, his and John Coats' motivation was to "get 
out" of the Hidden Ridge and the other projects which they had assumed from Kent Hogan. 
(R. 4148 at p. 246-248) 
38. Mehr's testimony confirms the fact that Taggart and Coats made this motivation 
clear, and Mehr believed that they wanted to be bought out of the Hidden Ridge project as < 
early as autumn of 1997. (R. 4157 at p. 162-164) 
39. Despite the fact that Taggart claims that as of autumn 1997 and continuing through 
the 1998 time period there was no money to pursue the Hidden Ridge and other projects he 
and Coats had agreed to fund, Taggart indicates that during the same time period he raised 
over 7 million dollars for other projects. (R. 4148 at p. 248-253). 
40. Mehr pleaded with Taggart and Coats on many occasions not to violate their 
agreement to provide the funding for the Newport and the Hidden Ridge projects. (R. 818- < 
827) 
41. Even though Taggart and Coats had stopped providing any funds to Aspenwood to 
keep the obligations current under the Newport REPC and Hidden Ridge Purchase 
Agreement, Taggart was still working on the Woods Cross, Clearfield, West Valley and 
Highland Oaks projects, as well as on the Hidden Ridge project. Mehr testified that he was 
aware of the fact that Taggart was experiencing monetary problems because he was 
continually complaining about money, but even though Taggart and Coats did not come I 
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forward with money, the three still talked about their mutual desire to try and figure out a 
way to continue to develop the aforementioned projects. Taggart's letter of October 20, 
1997, demonstrates that he was still working on the Clearfield project. Taggart made 
contact with Alpine Homes, which was actively pursuing the purchase of the Clearfield 
project. Mehr, Taggart and Coats all continued to believe that each of the five projects 
appeared to have excellent profit potential, and did not really want to lose them. Taggart 
began a series of negotiations with Oman and Hoggan in an attempt to restructure the 
payment arrangements under the Newport REPC and the Hidden Ridge Purchase Agreement 
in an effort to buy time to come up with the necessary funds. (R. 818-827) 
42. Through various meetings through the fall of 1997 and early 1998, Taggart, Coats 
and Mehr did their best to keep Oman and Hogan at bay, despite their repeated claims that 
Aspenwood had defaulted on its agreements by failing to make any payments after August 
of 1997. (R. 818-827). 
43. As a result of Taggart and Coats' refusal to advance funds to Aspenwood to enable it 
to fulfill its obligations, Oman and Hoggan (with respect to the Hidden Ridge project) and 
Hoggan separately (with respect to the other Newport projects) declared Aspenwood to be in 
default under the agreements in the Fall of 1997. (R. 4157 at pp. 77, 83, 89, 90, 92, 93, 99, 
100) 
44. Rather than defaulting on all of the projects, Taggart sought to persuade Hoggan and 
Oman to apply all of the payments made, whether under the Newport REPC or the separate 
Hidden Ridge agreement, to the first phase of the Hidden Ridge project. Mehr, Taggart and 
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Coats hoped to salvage some profit and obtain a return of their investment money by selling 
the first of four phases of the Hidden Ridge project. They also continued to discuss a buy 
back of the remaining three phases from Oman and Hoggan. (R. 5377 at 26, 27) 
45. In February, 1998, Oman and Hoggan caused their attorney, T. Richard Davis, to 
send a letter to Aspenwood declaring that owing to the failure to make payments as 
promised, the "Purchase Agreement is hereby terminated and that all rights, which 
Aspenwood may have heretofore held concerning the remaining property subject to the < 
Purchase Agreement have expired." Thus, Oman and Hoggan declared their intention not to 
let Aspenwood buy back Phases 2, 3 and 4 of the Hidden Ridge Development. (R. 4159-
4164) 
46. Taggart responded to Davis'letter on behalf of Aspenwood. Taggart claimed that 
they were still working on a buy back of the remaining phases and claimed a right to buy 
them back, in part due to Taggart5s claim that Aspenwood had paid approximately $2,000.00 
more per lot than was actually due on the first phase of the Hidden Ridge project. (R. 4159- < 
4164) 
47. No agreement to buy back the remaining phases of Hidden Ridge was ever reached 
with Oman or Hoggan. (R. 5377) 
48. As a result of the failure to pay amounts due and owing under the Newport REPC, 
Hoggan again took over the projects. Hoggan testified that he made a profit of "right around 
a million dollars" on the Highland Oaks project by simply selling it to another entity. 
Hoggan also testified that the buyers who purchased the Highland Oaks project are * 
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projecting a profit of 12-13 million dollars, which is well in excess of the 7 million dollar 
profit that he estimated at the time he had turned the project over to Mehr, Taggart and 
Coats. (R. 5397 at p. 82) 
49. While Hoggan has yet to produce documents subpoenaed to confirm his earnings on 
the projects which Defendants defaulted on and he ultimately took back, he has indicated to 
Hal Rosen that he has made 1.2 million dollars on the Clearfield project simply by selling or 
"flipping" it to someone else. He also indicated that he expects to make a significant profit 
on Woods Cross and Hidden Ridge. (R. 4150-4151) 
50. Aspenwood resumed construction of the onsite improvements at Hidden Ridge in the 
spring of 1998 when a development agreement was finally worked out with Springville City 
and the final plat recorded. (R. 818-827). 
51. Mehr, through his company Baucorp, worked on the construction of the onsite 
developments and by late July, had completed the majority of the onsite improvements and 
was ready to lay asphalt on Phase I. On August 20, 1998 Mehr wrote a letter to Paul Taggart 
and informed him that there were bills that were past due. Mehr also informed Taggart that 
he had learned thatUS Bank would not fund any further draws to pay for the cost of 
construction until interest payments on the construction loan were brought current. Mehr 
also informed Taggart that as of that time it appeared that the construction loan would be 
several hundred thousand dollars short of paying all the bills to complete the construction of 
the improvements to Phase I of Hidden Ridge, including the amounts due to Baucorp under 
its construction contract with Aspenwood. Mehr also discovered at or before this date that 
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Paul Taggart had taken approximately $20,000.00 in funds from the Aspenwood checking 
account and used it to pay some of his own personal expenses. As a result of what Mehr 
termed a wrongful diversion of funds, Mehr was required to obtain a loan in order to make 
Baucorp's payroll. (R. 818-827) 
i 
52. By November of 1998, the situation regarding unpaid bills with respect to the 
construction on the improvements in Hidden Ridge had become critical. As of November 9, 
1998 there were more than $319,000.00 in bills which had been incurred in developing the { 
Hidden Ridge project that had not been paid. Despite repeated demands from Mehr, Taggart 
and Coats refused to provide necessary financing to complete the development. (R. 818-
827). 
53. From the summer of 1997 until the fall of 1998, Mehr repeatedly told Taggart and 
< 
Coats that they were obligated to provide the necessary funding to keep the Aspenwood 
projects current. Mehr was personally not in a position to fund the projects himself, and 
believed that his agreements with Taggart and Coats prevented him from unilaterally < 
bringing on other partners to assist in the funding of these projects. However Mehr claims 
that he did suggest continuously that if Taggart and Coats did not wish to remain involved 
with the Hidden Ridge and other projects that they either find someone with money to buy 
them out or obtain a loan or do whatever else was necessary to ensure that Aspenwood did 
( 
not lose projects with profit potential in the millions of dollars. Mehr testified that both he 
and Taggart recognized the profit potential of the projects and did not wish to relinquish the 
opportunity, however both Taggart and Coats failed to obtain requisite financing. Finally, in < 
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November of 1998, with close to $320,000.00 in outstanding unpaid bills relating to the 
Hidden Ridge project alone, Mehr again approached Paul Taggart and asked him if he would 
relinquish his interest in the Hidden Ridge project. Thereafter, Mehr introduced Taggart to 
representatives of JMS Hidden LLC ("JMS-Hidden") who ultimately executed a purchase 
agreement to obtain Taggart and Coats' interest in Aspenwood. (R. 818-827) 
54. Taggart represented to JMS that: 
i. 80 of the 97 lots were sold (and at specific prices) 
ii. Home builder Russell/Packard would close "10 now," but not later than 
completion of Water a few short weeks away 
iii. Home builder Americraft would close 14 
iv. Closing of the rest of the lots purchased by them would take place between 
December, 1998, and May-June of 1999 
v. Water would be done by end of December, 1998, early January, 1999 
vi. Sewer would be done by end of February, 1999, or early March, 1999 
vii. Buyers would not require Sewer to be done prior to closing on lots, but may 
require that Water be done 
viii. The project was essentially complete, with only sidewalk, some road work and 
miscellaneous finish up work 
ix. Although supposedly unforeseen problems had arisen earlier in the project, 
and there had been cost over runs, and Dan Mehr had delayed work and had 
some other problems, as of December, 1998, all problems were known and 
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there would be no further surprises to JMS - including no further surprises 
with respect to Mehr and the scope and cost of the project 
x. There were approximately $320,000 in outstanding bills for work already 
performed , 
< 
xi. The cost of completing the remaining work on the project would be only about 
$118,000 
xii. All JMS would need to come out of pocket to complete the project, given the < 
represented status and timing of sales, was $300,000 
xiii. Taggart said the only reason he was getting out was to spend more time on 
other projects - he told JMS that the project was so good, and so close to 
completion, and the work and costs so manageable, that he was seriously 
considering just finishing it up himself, 
xiv. That Hoggan and Oman had acknowledged their wrongdoing and JMS would 
be able to obtain a favorable resolution with them so as to be able to pursue the i 
development of Phases 2, 3 and 4 of Hidden Ridge. (R. 4194-4307, 4425-
4444) 
55. CAT, through Taggart and Mehr, made these representations and warranties to JMS 
with the specific knowledge and intent that JMS rely upon them in deciding whether to 
purchase CAT's interest in Aspenwood. Taggart and CAT had a pecuniary interest in the 
project and transaction. Taggart and CAT were in a superior position to know the facts 
surrounding the Hidden Ridge project. JMS reasonably relied upon these representations < 
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and warranties in deciding to enter into the December 17, 1998 agreement to purchase 
CAT's interest in Aspenwood and to take over CAT's obligations to provide future funding 
for Aspenwood's needs. 
Despite these express representations and warranties, the following turned out to be 
true: 
a. The buyers would not close when Taggart told JMS they would because they 
insisted on waiting for the Sewer to be done, and Americraft bought other lots 
and refused to close altogether on most of its lots 
b. The work to complete the project turned out to be much more than Taggart 
told JMS that it would be 
c. The cost of completing the project turned out to be over $200,000 more than 
Taggart told JMS that it would be 
d. Although Taggart was fully aware of the facts, Taggart did not tell JMS about 
the Water problems (which cost JMS approximately $40,000 in damages), that 
the railroad lots were worthless (which resulted in $200,000 in lost sales 
revenue) and that the Buyers had told him in September and October of 1998 
that they were not going to close until Sewer was done (resulting in hundreds 
of thousands of dollars in carrying costs and lower sales prices) - Taggart 
never told JMS these critically material facts 
e. Dan Mehr knew or believed as of December 17, 1998, that the actual costs of 
completing the project were almost $400,000 - while at the same time he and 
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Taggart, on behalf of CAT, were leading JMS to believe that it would cost 
only approximately $118,000 to complete the project 
f. All of the supposed "extra" work on the project that caused the supposed "cost 
overruns" in the Spring of 1999 consisted of items which CAT, through Mehr 
4 
and Taggart, either knew, or should have known if they had properly and 
competently inquired of the facts and City requirements (water piping, dirt 
moving, detention pond work, road work, electrical conduit) < 
g. Taggart was intimately involved in the project (reviewed draws, inspected 
work, and had done a detailed proforma for US Bank and visited the site 
personally to inspect many times, including in October of 1998), and was or 
should have been aware of the status of the project, what was necessary to 
< 
complete it and the reasonable cost to complete it. 
h: Hoggan and Oman had not defrauded Aspenwood and were angry as a result 
of Taggart and CAT's failure to pay them and the underlying debt, so much so i 
that they had decided not to let Aspenwood proceed with development of 
Phases 2, 3 and 4. 
Clearly Taggart and CAT omitted to disclose material facts, and misrepresented other 
facts. The warranties turned out not to be true, JMS reasonably relied, CAT intended JMS 
4 
to rely, and JMS suffered damage. But, there is much, much more. The evidence clearly 
showed areas of irrefutable intentional and knowing misrepresentations, areas of reckless 
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misrepresentations, and at the very least, negligent misrepresentation. (R. 4194-4307, 4425-
4444) 
56. In the Spring of 1999, JMS-Hidden, for itself and as the new manager of Aspenwood, 
was faced with claims by Taggart and Coats, backed up to some extent by Mehr, that 
Aspenwood had claims against Oman and Hoggan. Oman and Hoggan, on the other hand, 
disputed those claims and made counter allegations against Taggart, and as a result of 
Taggart's actions, against Aspenwood. (R. 1-26, R. 1700-1703) 
57. When Oman and Hoggan refused to settle with Aspenwood on acceptable terms, 
Aspenwood filed suit claiming, based on Taggart's representations, that Oman and Hoggan 
committed certain wrongful acts; and, in the alternative, in case the facts turned out to 
support Oman and Hoggan's version of the facts, that Taggart and Coats had wrongfully 
caused Aspenwood to default on its obligations. (R. 1-26, R. 1700-1703) 
58. As a result of the misrepresentations, JMS filed suit against CAT for the 
misrepresentations made in connection with the acquisition of CAT's interest in 
Aspenwood, and Aspenwood as an entity filed suit against CAT and Taggart and Coats for 
their breach of their obligation to provide financing. (R. 1-26) 
59. On January 11, 2000, Plaintiffs noticed up the depositions of eight witnesses in this 
litigation. These depositions were scheduled to take place between January 21, and 
February 22, 2000. In that notice, Plaintiffs set Dan Mehr's deposition for February 17, 
2000. (R. 185-216) 
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60. On January 12, 2000, Plaintiffs received a letter from Defense counsel Stephen 
Mitchell in which he stated that Plaintiffs "need to respond to (his) discovery and produce 
the requested documents before deposition (sic) commence." (R. 162-173) 
61. Along with Mr. Mitchell's letter was a Notice of Depositions for Dan Mehr and Brian 
Steffensen. Defendants purported to notice Mr. Mehr's deposition for February 4, 2000, at 
Mr. Mitchell's offices. (R. 162-173) 
62. On January 19, 2000, Plaintiffs received a letter from Mr. Mitchell in which he { 
reaffirmed his intention to delay depositions until additional discovery responses were 
received. (R. 162-173) 
68. On February 4, 2000, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to Mr. Mitchell expressing the 
position that Plaintiffs expected him to honor an agreement made earlier 
< 
in the week to produce Mssrs. Taggart and Coats for their depositions. Plaintiffs 
reiterated their position that, since all parties agreed Mssrs. Taggart and Coats were 
appropriate persons as the first two deponents, counsel on both sides had set aside time < 
for these depositions on February 8th and 9th, respectively. Furthermore, since the issue of 
Mr. Mehr's deposition would likely have to be resolved before a court, there was no reason 
to delay discovery by withholding Mssrs. Taggart and Coats. (R. 162-173) 
69. On February 7, 2000, Plaintiffs' counsel received a letter from Mr. Mitchell stating 
that he would not produce Taggart or Coats for their depositions (on February 8th or 9th, 
respectively) until his motion for a protective order (regarding Mr. Mehr's deposition - then 
noticed redundantly by Mr. Mitchell for February 14th) had been heard. (R. 162-173) < 
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73. On February 8, 2000, Plaintiffs' counsel received by mail the Defendants' Motion for 
Protective Order and Memorandum and Affidavit filed therewith. Despite the caption, this 
motion appears to be a Motion to Compel the depositions of Mssrs. Mehr and Steffensen 
according to Defendants' timetable. Defendants had not filed a Motion for Protective Order 
regarding the depositions of Mssrs. Taggart and Coats. Mr. Mitchell simply refused to 
produce these parties as noticed and agreed. (R. 161-173) 
74. On February 11, 2000, counsel for Plaintiffs sent a letter to Mr. Mitchell again 
reiterating the position that counsel had never refused to produce Dan Mehr. That letter 
further stated that Mr. Mehr was not represented by Steffensen Law Office in this matter and 
that Plaintiffs did not have the ability or obligation to produce Mr. Mehr for deposition. In 
fact, that letter pointed out again that Plaintiffs' deposition of Dan Mehr would be taken 
pursuant to subpoena. (R. 161-173) 
75. On Monday, February 14, 2000, counsel for Plaintiffs traveled to the offices of 
Burbidge & Mitchell for the deposition of Dan Mehr as noticed by Defendants. The 
deposition was not held as Defendants failed to subpoena Mr. Mehr.(R. 161-173) 
76. In April of 2000, a hearing on various motions involving discovery disputes was held 
before Judge Bohling. Rather than conduct an in-court hearing, Judge Bohling invited 
counsel to sit down with him in chambers to discuss the motions. No record of the in-
chamber meeting was made. (R. (see docket index) ) 
77. During the informal hearing, the Court decided to enter a scheduling order which 
imposed a strict order of depositions and limited JMS' ability to depose third party 
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witnesses, and resulted in great prejudice to JMS' ability to conduct discovery. (R. 252-254, 
670-762,795-800)
 1 
78. At the informal hearing on April 18, 2000, Judge Bohling also inquired as to whether 
the case was to be tried to the bench or to a jury. Mr. Mitchell indicated that he had not made 
4 
a jury request. Mr. Steffensen, counsel for JMS, stated he believed a request had been made 
and that JMS desired a jury trial, but that the file would have to be checked to verify. Mr. 
Steffensen further indicated that if a request had not been made, it would be. Judge Bohling < 
indicated that he did not have the file at present and did not recall seeing a jury trial request. 
Then, Judge Bohling indicated that he would order the trial as non-jury for the time being, 
but if in fact the jury request had been made, JMS would get a jury trial and the order would 
be changed. JMS' counsel accepted such disposition based on the assurances of Judge 
Bohling that the jury issue would be researched and jury trial would be granted, if indeed it 
had been requested. JMS5 counsel never indicated that a jury trial had been waived or that 
they intended to waive a jury trial. After the hearing, JMS'counsel checked the Court file, i 
and found that a jury had been requested. (R. 3779-3793) 
79. Subsequently, at a status conference held with Judge Bohling on March 30, 2001, the 
issue of a jury trial was again raised. Mr. Steffensen indicated that a jury trial had been 
requested. Mr. Mitchell argued that the case should be tried to the bench. Both sides put 
their positions on the record. Judge Bohling then ruled that JMS had waived its right to a 
jury trial. (R. 3779-3793) 
80. CAT moved for partial summary judgment on October 20, 2000. (R. 376-518) i 
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81. As discovery was not yet complete and could not be completed by the deadline 
imposed by the April 18, 2000 Scheduling Order, JMS moved to continue discovery and for 
a new scheduling order and Trial date (R. 670-762) 
82. JMS also made a motion for a Rule 56(f) continuance to complete discovery and 
submitted a memorandum in support of that motion and alternative memorandum in 
opposition to Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. The summary judgment 
motion resulted in a hearing held on December 19, 2000 wherein the Court requested 
additional memoranda from the parties. Additional memoranda were submitted, and the 
Court made a ruling in favor of CAT's motion for partial summary judgment. Objections 
were made to the proposed order. Ultimately, Partial Summary Judgment was entered on 
March 13, 3001. Due to the voluminous documentation surrounding the motion for partial 
summary judgment, copies of Aspenwood's papers, transcripts of the hearings held, 
objections filed, and all other documents pertinent to the motion for partial summary 
judgment have been compiled by JMS and are submitted herewith and incorporated into this 
brief by reference as Addendum Four. (Addendum 4) 
83. At the status conference held before the Court in March, 2001, JMS learned that the 
Court intended to deny JMS the jury trial which it had both requested and paid for. (R. 1-26, 
R.3771-3774) 
84. JMS filed a Motion for Rule 54(B) Certification and to Continue Trial Date, which 
was opposed and ultimately denied (R. 859, 5373, 5374) 
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85. JMS also filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's Ruling on Jury Trial. Copies of 
the various moving papers pertaining to this motion and the Court's Order thereon are 
submitted herewith and incorporated into this brief by reference as Addendum Five. 
(Addendum 5) 
86. An Order on Waiver of Jury Trial was entered on April 19, 2001. (R. 4152-4154) 
87. Trial began on April 17, 2001 and continued through April 20, 2001. The Court 
requested Supplemental Memoranda before issuing a ruling on the case. JMS' supplemental < 
post-trial memoranda, as well as the transcript of the hearing thereon, are submitted herewith 
and incorporated into this brief by reference as Addendum Six. (Addendum 6) 
88. The Court ultimately announced its intention to rule on behalf of CAT. Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were submitted, and Objections were filed thereto. 
< 
On June 28, 2002, the Court issued a Minute Entry adopting the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as Modified, Denying Oral Argument, and Entering Judgment. Copies 
of the Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, as well as the objections filed i 
thereto, are submitted herewith and incorporated into this brief by reference as Addendum 
Seven. (Addendum 7) 
89. Following the commencement of appellate proceedings, CAT commenced collection 
and execution proceedings. Following entry of Judgment, CAT obtained an Order in 
Supplemental Proceedings dated July 6, 2001. The Order in Supplemental Proceedings 
purported to require JMS-Hidden, L.L.C.("JMS-Hidden"), and JMS-Financial, L.L.C. 
("JMS-Financiar)"through Harold Rosen to be examined concerning their assets, liabilities i 
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and financial affairs" before a court reporter on July 13, 2001 at the offices of CAT's 
counsel. The Order in Supplemental Proceedings further ordered Mr. Rosen to bring with 
him for copying and inspection "(1) all financial statements, profit and loss statements, 
balance sheets, income statements, general ledgers of JMS-Hidden, L.L.C., JMS-Financial, 
L.L.C, JMS-Meadow, L.L.C. and JMS-Brook, L.L.C.; (2) all agreements, notes, Trust 
Deeds, and/or security agreements between JMS-Meadow, L.L.C. and Scott R. Turville 
and/or the Monte Cannon Nelson Trust and David M. Nelson and/or City Properties, L.L.C. 
relating to the Meadowlands project in West Valley City, Utah; and (3) all other documents 
necessary to identify the assets and liabilities of said entities and any liens or encumbrances 
against the assets of said entities, including the amount thereof."(R- 4731-4732) 
90. CAT served a copy of the Order in Supplemental Proceedings along with a Subpoena 
Duces Tecum to Harold Rosen on the evening of July 6, 2001. The scheduled examination 
was July 13, 2001. Mr. Rosen was going to be in Wyoming on the 13th of July, and the 
Subpoena Duces Tecum failed to give Mr. Rosen 14 days notice as required under Rule 45 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, on July 12, 2001 Mr. Rosen filed a 
Motion for Protective Order and a Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum. (R. 4807-
4710) 
91. Appellants contend that Mr. Rosen was served in a personal capacity. The Order in 
Supplemental Proceedings was never served upon JMS-Hidden or JMS-Financial. In 
addition to the fact that the Order in Supplemental Proceedings was not served on JMS-
Financial or JMS-Hidden, the Order also sought to obtain testimony from the judgment 
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debtors (via Mr. Rosen) concerning the assets and liabilities of entities which were not 
judgment debtors or even parties to the action. (R. 4731-4732) 
92. On July 18,2001, Appellants filed a Motion to Set Aside Order in Supplemental 
Proceedings and a Consolidated Memorandum in Support of (1) Motion for Protective Order 
(2) to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum; (3) Set Aside Order in Supplemental Proceedings. 
(R. 4815-4851) 
93. These motions were heard by the Court on July 19, 2001. The Court held that despite 
the fact that the Subpoena Duces Tecum had been served on "Harold Rosen" and had not 
been served upon the registered agent or the managing entity of JMS-Financial or JMS-
Hidden, the Court found that service on Mr. Rosen personally was the equivalent of service 
upon JMS-Financial and JMS-Hidden, the judgment debtors. The Court also found that 
service was proper and no order shortening the time for Rosen's examination was necessary, < 
despite the fact that no request for such an order, let alone good cause for such an order, had 
been made. Rather than grant him 14 days from the date of the hearing to prepare for the 
i 
deposition, the Court ordered Mr. Rosen to appear on July 30, 2001. Without entering any 
evidence into the record in support of such a conclusion, the Court stated that even if an 
order to shorten the time was necessary, "good cause existed to shorten the time because of 4 
the actions that JMS has undertaken to encumber its assets since the Court announced its 
ruling on June 1, 2001." (R. 4900-4903) 
94. The Court did modify the Order in Supplemental Proceedings to some extent with 
respect to the documents which Mr. Rosen was required to bring with him. The Order of 
July 26, 2001 was directed to JMS, but required Mr. Rosen to appear to testify on behalf of 4 
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JMS on July 30, 2001. The Order indicated that if Rosen did not have documents pertaining 
to the non-parties JMS-Meadow, L.L.C. ("JMS-Meadow") and JMS-Brook, L.L.C. ("JMS-
Brook") "in his capacity as president of J.D. West, [Inc.], which is a member of JMS-
Financial, and JMS itself do not have in their possession records concerning the business of 
JMS-Meadows, L.L.C. and JMS-Brook, L.L.C, such documents are not required to be 
produced at the examination." (R. 4900-4903) 
95. Rosen subsequently appeared on July 30, 2001 and provided CAT with the 
documents in his possession which related to the business affairs of the judgment debtors, 
JMS-Hidden and JMS-Financial. Mr. Rosen, despite the objections of counsel, insisted that 
he would appear without counsel at the deposition. In addition to providing all of the recent 
and updated information he had concerning the judgment debtors, he also provided some 
information regarding the affairs of JMS-Meadow, JMS-Brook and Aspenwood, L.L.C. He 
complied with the order and the rulings of the Court as given on July 19, 2001, and even 
gave information beyond what he had been required to give. (R. 5384, 5126-5195, 5196-
5199) 
96. However, CAT wanted Mr. Rosen to testify as to the internal affairs and private 
dealings of Aspenwood, JMS-Meadow, and JMS-Brook. Despite the badgering of CAT's 
counsel, Mr. Rosen indicated that he was not prepared to testify for those entities who were 
not judgment debtors or parties to the action and the supplemental proceedings thereon. 
CAT subsequently moved for an Order to Show Cause. (R. 5384, 5126-5199) 
97. At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, which was held on August 21, 2001, 
CAT misrepresented by proffer of counsel the events of the deposition. A transcript of the 
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i 
deposition proceedings was not placed into evidence. Counsel for Appellants pointed out to 
the Court that Mr. Rosen had complied with the previous order of the Court, and even read 
back to the Court the language used in the July 19, 2001 hearing. Additionally, counsel 
pointed out that there was no evidentiary basis to hold Mr. Rosen in contempt or sanction the 
JMS entities, because there had been no evidence entered into the record, other than the 
proffers of counsel. Counsel also offered to read the unsigned deposition transcript into the 
record at that time if there was any question at all in the Court's mind regarding Rosen's 
compliance. Counsel for Appellants also requested an evidentiary hearing on the matter, and 
requested the Court to recess the proceedings so that a full evidentiary hearing could be held. 
At that time, Mr. Rosen had not even had an opportunity to review the transcript. Without 
so much as looking at the transcript, the Court expressed "outrage" at counsel and Mr. 
Rosen and found Mr. Rosen and the JMS entities had failed to comply with the previous 
orders of the Court. Rosen and the judgment debtors were sanctioned, and Rosen was 
ordered to appear and "answer the questions that are asked" with no reference to the Court's 
earlier limitations on the scope of inquiry into the private business affairs of the non-parties 
and non-judgment debtors, JMS-Meadow, JMS-Brook, and Aspenwood, L.L.C. (R. 5384, 
5126-5199).
 { 
98. CAT also sought an injunction against Aspenwood, L.L.C. The motion for 
preliminary injunction was heard on August 1, 2001. Aspenwood, L.L.C. is not a judgment 
i 
debtor. However, the Court entered an order which amounted to placing Aspenwood into a 
de facto receivership and prevented Aspenwood from paying any of its debts without prior 
approval of either CAT's counsel or the Court. The Court indicated that if opposing { 
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counsel objected to the payment of the debt, then the matter would be set for hearing and the 
Court would determine whether or not the debt was to be paid. Aspenwood was no longer a 
party, its claims having been dismissed via summary judgment. Further, there was no 
judgment against Aspenwood. (R. 4908-4916, 5383, 5067) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Overly Restrictive and Unwarranted Discovery Orders Deprived Plaintiffs/Appelants 
of The Ability to Engage in Full and Fair Discovery. The Trial Court's restrictive discovery 
and scheduling orders had the cumulative effect of depriving plaintiffs/appellants of their 
constitutional right to conduct full and fair discovery in preparation for trial on the merits. 
Upon remand for trial by jury, the discovery period should be reopened to allow full and fair 
discovery in to the many aspects of these complex claims. 
Despite Having Timely Requested and Paid for a Jury Trial Judge Bohling 
Improperly Deprived JMS of its Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury. Plaintiffs/Appellants 
timely requested a jury, and paid the jury fee. There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
plaintiffs/appellants waived the right to jury - except Judge Bohling's claim that he 
"remembered" that they did. Judge Bohling's testimony in this regard is unreliable and 
inadmissible. It strains credibility that Judge Bohling could "remember" an undistinguished 
pretrial conference conducted a year earlier. Further, it is improper for a Judge to base a 
ruling on his own testimony as to what happened. Trial by jury is too important a right to be 
lost without clear and unequivocal evidence in the record that it was in fact waived. No 
such clear and unequivocal evidence of waiver of jury trial is found in the record. To the 
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contrary, the record on its face demonstrates that jury trial was in fact timely requested and 
paid for. It was an abuse of discretion for Judge Bohling to have denied the 
plaintiffs/appellants their right to trial by jury. Judge Bohling5s rulings at trial should be 
vacated in their entirety and this matter remanded for trial de novo by a jury (after a full and 
fair discovery period). 
Summary Judgment Against Aspenwood Was Improperly Granted In Light of the 
Material Facts Which Aspenwood Placed in Clear Dispute. The dismissal of Aspenwood's { 
claims against Taggart, Coats and CAT for breach of agreements to fund certain projects on 
summary judgment was reversible error. Aspenwood submitted an affidavit of Dan Mehr 
disputing essential and material issues of fact. Aspenwood demonstrated overwhelmingly 
that Mehr's deposition testimony was consistent with his affidavit testimony,. Aspenwood 
further pointed out that the Aspenwood operating agreement was never intended to be an 
"integratation" of the parties agreements, and as such could not preclude parol evidence of 
the parties'agreements with respect to funding. Finally, Aspenwood produced sworn i 
testimony that even if the Aspenwood operating agreement was an "integrated" agreement, 
that after it was executed, Taggart, Coats and CAT had reaffirmed their agreement and 
commitment to fund the five projects which Taggart's due diligence had shown were 
financially attractive. As such, it was an abuse of discretion and incorrect for Judge Bohling 
to have granted CAT's motion for summary judgment. 
The Findings of Fact and Consequent Conclusions of Law, Fly in the Face of the 
Undisputed Facts Adduced at Trial. Judgment Should be Directed in Favor of JMS. At 4 
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trial, the evidence as to what Taggart knew about the Hidden Ridge project, and what 
Taggart told JMS about the project, were clear and undisputed in various critical particulars. 
These included many express warranties about the status of the project - such as, there will 
be "no more surprises," because Taggart and Coats had their "arms around" project and 
knew what what left to do and what it would cost to do it. Despite JMS' detailed outline of 
this undisputed evidence, with extensive citations to and or direct quotes from the Trial 
Record, set forth in JMS' Supplemental Post-Trial Briefs, Judge Bohling ignored these 
UNDISPUTED facts and entered findings contrary to them. Based on these false and 
unsupported findings, Judge Bohling incorrectly concluded as a matter of law that Taggart 
had made no warranties to JMS, that Taggart had made no misrepresentations to JMS, and 
the like. This Appellate Court must carefully analyze these the UNDISPUTED facts. Judge 
Bohling committed clear error with respect to many of his critical findings of fact. 
Judgment for JMS should be directed as a result of the facts as demonstrated in the Addenda 
attached hereto. 
Post-Trial Rulings Violated Procedural and Jurisdictional Requirements and Must be 
Vacated. After the judgment was entered against JMS herein, CAT commenced efforts to 
collect thereon. Unfortunately, CAT failed to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure in 
certain regards when it undertook these efforts. JMS complained and opposed these 
procedurally improper actions. At first, Judge Bohling agreed and ordered CAT to correct 
its procedural defects. But, with respect CAT's attempt to subpoena and obtain testimony 
from Harold Rosen, Judge Bohling issued various orders which violate the Rules of Civil 
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regarding the deposition of Mr. Mehr. 
Rule 37 of Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part, that 
"(i)f a party.... fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being 
served with a proper notice,....the court in which the action is pending on motion may make 
such orders in regard to the failure as are just...." Utah RCP 37(d). Furthermore, "(i)n lieu 
of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to act or the 
attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, 
caused by the failure...." Utah RCP 37(d). 
Mr. Mitchell claimed to have a right to proceed with Mr. Mehr's deposition on the 
14th of February despite the fact that JMS had already noticed Mr. Mehr's deposition 
for March 9th. CAT's notice, which set Mr. Mehr's deposition for February 14, 
2000, was neither rescinded nor amended. Pursuant to this pending notice, counsel for 
JMS traveled to Mr. Mitchell's office for Dan Mehr's deposition on February 14, 
2000. However, that deposition did not take place because CAT had failed to 
subpoena Mr. Mehr. 
A party's counsel is not entitled to unilaterally ignore the proper notice of 
depositions because he does not agree with the scheduling of a later deposition in the 
case. The proper action under the Rules of Civil Procedure is to apply to the court for a 
protective order. Instead, Mr. Mitchell refused to produce two properly noticed party 
witnesses for depositions, in violation of Rule 37(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court should have so found. 
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1 
B. The Ruling Establishing an Order/Priority of Taking Depositions was 
Procedurally Improper and Resulted in Prejudice JMS 
On January 11, 2000, less than a week following the Court's Order of Consolidation, 
JMS sent out a Notice of Depositions of Paul Taggart, John Coats, Lonnie Oman, Kent 
Hogan, Brent Metcalfe, Dan Mehr, Brent Watson and Pam Watson. CAT filed competing 
notices of depositions and filed a motion for protective order to prevent the taking of the 
depositions as noticed, and JMS was forced to file their own motion for protective order and ' 
motion to compel. These motions resulted in a hearing on April 18, 2000, wherein this 
Court entered an Order stating: 
" 1 . Depositions shall be taken in the following order: 
1. Plaintiffs shall first take the depositions of the Defendants Paul Taggart 
and John Coats; 
2. Defendants shall then take the depositions of the individuals who are 
principals of Plaintiffs or of Plaintiffs members, including Dan Mehr, 
Brent Watson, Pam Watson and Hal Rosen; 
3. Plaintiffs shall then take the depositions of the third party witnesses 
previously noticed by Plaintiffs; 
4; The deposition of Brian W. Steffensen shall be taken only after 
completion of the depositions listed above in order that the parties 
may ascertain what facts are still in dispute and the matters on which 
Defendants still need to take the deposition of Mr. Steffensen. 
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In the event Mr. Steffensen's deposition is noticed by Defendants and the 
parties are unable to agree to the scope of that deposition, Mr. Steffensen may 
apply to the court for a protective order at that time with respect to the scope 
of the deposition. 
5. Counsel for the parties shall meet and attempt to agree on mutually 
convenient dates for the taking of the foregoing depositions. In the event the parties are 
unable to agree on the dates for the taking of the depositions, either party may make further 
application to the Court to schedule the depositions. 
6. Brian W. Steffensen's individual claims in this action for defamation and 
interference with business relations are dismissed without prejudice." 
On or about July 19, 2000, counsel for CAT and David Condie, co-counsel for JMS, 
spoke on the telephone concerning depositions in this case. Counsel for CAT indicated that 
the first available dates for the depositions of John Coats and Paul Taggart were August 16 
and 17, 2000. The deposition of John Coats was commenced on August 16, 2000, but not 
completed owing to the need to obtain documents. The deposition of Paul Taggart was 
commenced on August 22 and 23, but not completed owing to the need to obtain and review 
documents. 
Dan Mehr's deposition was commenced by Mr. Mitchell on August 29, but not 
completed due to the need of obtaining documents. Likewise, Mr. Rosen's deposition 
was commenced and continued for the production of documents. Owing to scheduling 
conflicts, the depositions ofPam and Brent Watson were not taken until October 6th and 
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9th, respectively. Pam Watson's deposition was continued for production of documents. 
JMS sought to take the depositions of Kent Hogan and Lonnie Oman on October 5 
and 6. However, CAT insisted on strict adherence to this Court's Order regarding the 
order of depositions, and Mr. Mitchell insisted that the depositions be rescheduled. 
Owing to the lack of time remaining before the discovery cutoff, JMS conveyed their 
intention to proceed with the depositions of Oman and Hogan as noticed. 
On October 3, 2000, faced with a discovery cutoff less than ten days away, and ( 
still faced with over TWENTY SEVEN depositions to be taken or completed, the parties 
entered into an agreement for the completion of discovery. Unfortunately, despite the best 
efforts of the parties, the agreement of October 3, 2000 did not provide the time necessary 
to complete the discovery contemplated therein. 
The discovery situation in the case at the time JMS' motion was filed may be very 
briefly and incompletely summarized as follows: the depositions of Paul Taggart, John 
Coats, Brent Metcalfe, Hal Rosen, Pam Watson, Dan Mehr, had been commenced but had 
yet to be completed. JMS was not provided access to documents necessary to complete the 
depositions of Paul Taggart and John Coats until Friday, October 27, 2000, and JMS had 
still not received copies of said documents. Until they received those documents, Plaintiffs 
could not resume and complete the depositions of parties Taggart and Coats. 
The depositions of Lonnie Oman, Kent Hogan, Jim Ritchie, John Quitiquit, David 
Steffensen, Brian Steffensen and Richard Kohler had been noticed but not yet taken or 
completed. 
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The depositions indicated above would most likely have lead JMS to additional 
sources of information and/or individuals whose identities were unknown at that time who 
may have had relevant and discoverable information and additional depositions other than 
those contemplated in the October 3, 2000 agreement were indeed necessary. 
At almost all times during the course of discovery in this case, Appellants were 
restricted in their ability to conduct full and fair discovery. 
II. THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER. 
A. JMS5 Rule 56(f) motion was improperly denied and prejudiced 
Plaintiffs 
Cases should be tried on their merits. Motions for Summary Judgment should not be 
heard until the parties have had a chance to complete discovery. The Utah Supreme Court 
has long been in agreement with this position. In the case of Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 
at 315 (Utah 1984) the Court held that "...Rule 56(f) motions should be granted liberally and 
that inasmuch as an adequate opportunity for discovery had not been provided, the motion 
for summary judgment should be adjourned pending the completion of discovery." 
URCP Rule 56(f) provides: 
When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present 
by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
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Utah case law clearly states that where discovery is incomplete a motion for summary 
judgment should not be granted, unless the movant has been wholly dilatory or the motion is 
entirely lacking in merit. See Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); American Towers Owners Assoc, v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 
1195 (Utah 1996) (56(f) motion is to be liberally construed); Patty Precision v. Brown and 
Sharpe Manufacturing Co., 42 F.2d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 1984) ("An affidavit under Rule 
56(f) should be treated liberally...."); Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 998 
F.2d 1550, 1554 ("the motion should be liberally treated.") 
As demonstrated by the discovery efforts undertaken in the months from August to 
December of 2000, Plaintiffs were not dilatory, and simply sought sufficient time to 
complete their ongoing discovery efforts. The present case involved discovery into 
numerous large and complex real estate developments, with many underlying contracts and 
third parties, etc. Plaintiffs were obstructed in their discovery efforts by the strict order of 
depositions which had been imposed, making it impossible for Plaintiffs to notice any third 
party depositions until mid October, 2000. Discovery was far from complete at the time 
Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiffs should have been given 
additional time to complete discovery and have all of the Defendants documents, deposition 
transcripts, etc.,available to them in order to properly respond to the motion for summary 
judgment. Defendants made an early motion for summary judgment in an effort to cut off 
discovery and try the summary judgment portion of the case in a vacuum of incomplete 
discovery. 
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The depositions of Dan Mehr, Hal Rosen and Pam Watson were not completed until 
November 13, 2000, however transcripts for the completed depositions were not available as 
of the date by which Plaintiffs had to respond to the motion for summary judgment. Lonnie 
Oman was deposed on November 14, 2000, but his transcript was likewise unavailable. The 
depositions of Paul Taggart, John Coats, Brent Metcalfe, Richard Kohler, Kent Hoggan, Jim 
Ritchie, hade been commenced but not yet completed. The partial transcripts of Hoggan and 
Ritchie were not yet available. Plaintiffs pointed out to the trial court that there were also 
many other third party depositions which needed to be taken of individuals which were 
believed to have evidence regarding the issues presented for summary judgment. However, 
despite the fact that discovery was still ongoing, the Court denied the Rule56(f) Motion and 
heard the summary judgment motion on only a part of the evidence which was ultimately 
obtained. The Order denying the 56(f) Motion should be reversed. 
B. Genuine Issues of Material Fact were in Dispute which Precluded 
Summary Judgment 
1. There was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not 
there was a contract between Mehr, Taggart and Coats to fund the 
Newport REPC projects. 
The law is well established that if there are any material issues of fact in dispute, a 
motion for summary judgment must not be granted. Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick 
Co.,780 P.2d 827, (Utah App. 1989)(Because disposition of a case on summary judgment 
denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning questions of fact, including 
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in favor of 
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the opposing party) See also, Frisbee v. K & K Constr. Co.. 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984); 
Reeves v. Geigv Pharmaceutical Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah Ct.App.1988). "Trial courts 
must avoid weighing evidence and assessing credibility when ruling on motions for 
summary judgment. Trujillo v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 986 P.2d 752, 764 (Utah App. 1999) 
Also see Dubois v. Grand Central 872 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah Ct.App.1994). 
In cases involving the interpretation of a document or an agreement, "it is not 
appropriate for a court to weigh disputed evidence concerning such factors; the sole inquiry 
to be determined is whether there is a material issue of fact to be decided." Spor v. Crested 
Butte Silver Min.. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987); See also W.M. Barnes Co. v. 
Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981). "It is of no moment that the 
evidence on one side may appear to be strong or even compelling,... documentary evidence 
is not dispositive if the intent and purpose underlying the documents are at issue." Id. 
In the case at bar, the deposition and affidavit testimony, plus the language of the 
Operating Agreement, presented a genuine issue of disputed material fact as to the 
agreements which were entered into by Mehr, Taggart and Coats. During the hearing on 
summary judgment held on December 19, 2001,the Court acknowledged that Mehr's 
affidavit placed several issues in dispute and almost denied the motion then and there. But, 
CAT's counsel complained that Mehr's affidavit was not consistent with his Deposition 
testimony and should be rejected. The Court seized on this argument, and asked the parties 
to brief the issue of whether Mehr's Deposition testimony supported the statements in his 
Supplemental Affidavit to the effect that there was a clear, binding agreement that Taggart, 
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Coats and CAT would provide funding for the Newport projects selected for development 
because of their economic viability. The supplemental affidavit of Dan Mehr, and the 
supplemental memoranda submitted by JMS and Aspenwood clearly and overwhelmingly 
demonstrated that Mehr's prior deposition testimony was consistent with the affidavits 
submitted by Mehr which had almost convinced Judge Bohling to deny the motion for 
summary judgment, and that Taggart's own testimony supported Mehr's position and 
statements as well. Plaintiffs several memoranda in opposition to the motion, as well as 
Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Proposed Order Granting Summary Judgment (R. 
2552-2575) and Reply Memorandum to Defendants' opposition thereto (R. 3448-3706) set 
forth in almost exhausting detail the fact that there were disputed issues of material fact, and 
demonstrating the argumentative and conclusory nature of what the Defendants' had tried to 
pass off as "undisputed facts." 
Yet, the Court seemed intent on granting the motion, and in order to do so, came to 
the following unsupported and improper conclusions: 
1. The Operating Agreement for Aspenwood was an integrated agreement, which 
barred any testimony about prior agreements which were inconsistent with the terms of the 
Operating Agreement; and 
2. The Operating Agreement was unambiguous on its face, and did not require CAT 
to fond the projects which had been selected by Taggart, Coats and Mehr for development. 
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Based on theses conclusions, the Court concluded that it could dismiss Aspenwood's 
claims that CAT had breached its agreements to fund the five selected and agreed upon 
projects. These conclusions were erroneous for the following reasons: 
1. Whether an agreement was intended to be an integrated agreement is an issue of 
fact. Mehr testified that the Operating Agreement was not intended to be an integration of 
all of the parties' agreements. It was improper for Judge Bohling to conclude, as a matter of 
fact, that the Operating Agreement was integrated. This issue should have been saved for 
trial by the jury. 
2. There are two sections in the Operating Agreement which appear to be 
inconsistent. One requires CAT to provide all necessary funds for the projects. The other 
provides that member does not have to make contributions to the company without its 
consent. Aspenwood argued that the first provision - requiring CAT to finance 
Aspenwood's development efforts - governed the second - i.e., CAT gave its "consent" to 
fund development as per the second provision when it agreed in the first to in fact fund the 
projects. CAT argued that the second provision allowed CAT to ignore and not comply with 
the first provision requiring it to fund. 
Aspenwood asks this Court to agree with its construction of this language - and find 
that the only want to construe the provisions consistently is via Aspenwood's construction. 
But, if this Court denies to adopt Aspenwood's construction of these two provisions, that 
this Court at the very least declare that the provisions are ambiguous and that Judge Bohling 
erred when he declared the Operating Agreement to be unambiguous. This Court should 
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also find that, given the ambiguity, parole evidence is not only allowable, but necessary in 
order to determine what the parties intended. The Summary Judgment should have been 
denied and evidence taken at trial as to what the parties intended the Operating Agreement 
to provide as to funding of projects. 
Finally, even if Judge Bohling were correct in his construction of the Operating 
Agreement, Summary Judgment should still have been denied. Mehr testified that after the 
Operating Agreement was signed, the parties met and reaffirmed - i.e., agreed anew - that 
Aspenwood should pursue the five selected projects and that CAT would provide the 
funding for each of the selected projects. Aspenwood argued that based on these post-
Operating Agreement agreements/promises, Aspenwood should be allowed to present 
testimony at trial that such commitments were made, then breached, and that Aspenwood 
suffered damages as a result thereof. 
For any one of these reasons, the Summary Judgment motion should have been 
denied. It was reversible error to grant the Summary Judgment. The order doing so should 
be reversed and Aspenwood allowed to go to trial on these issues after an appropriate 
discovery period. 
2. The Trial Court Made an Improper Factual Determination that the Operating 
Agreement was an Integration. Whether or not a contract is integrated is a 
question of fact. Mehr's affidavits and deposition testimony demonstrate that 
the Operating Agreement of Aspenwood, L.L.C. was never intended to be an 
integration. In addition, even if the Operating Agreement was an integrated 
contract, Taggart and Coats made agreements to fund the Newport REPC 
projects after the Operating Agreement was signed and they performed on those 
agreements, providing over $500,000.00 of their own money toward the projects 
AFTER the Operating Agreement was signed. 
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Faced with a literal tsunami of evidence regarding a dispute as to whether or not an 
agreement had existed between Mehr, Taggart and Coats for the latter two to provide 
funding for the Newport REPC projects, the Defendants argued that even if there had been 
an agreement regarding funding, the integration clause contained in the Aspenwood 
Operating Agreement made any such prior or contemporaneous agreements irrelevant and 
barred any extrinsic evidence of their existence. 
Paragraph 3.2 of the Aspenwood Operating Agreement provides that "The 
Management Group [Dan Mehr] shall not provide funds to the Company for the purchaseor 
development of property...." 
Paragraph 3.3 reads "The Investment Group [Taggart and Coats] shall provide funds 
to the Company for the purchase of real Property and for approvals,engineering, utilities, 
improvements, property taxes and other development costs." 
Paragraph 3.4 reads: 
Additional Contributions. The Members may from time to time be required to make 
additional contributions to the capital of the Company. However, the requirement to make 
additional capital contributions shall be in accordance with Section 3.3 and shall be 
approved by the unanimous agreement of all Members. Voluntary contributions of 
additional capital also may be made by the Members, with the consent of the Executive 
Manager or a majority of the Members. 
Except as indicated above, the Members have not agreed to and are not obligated to 
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make any other contributions to the capital of the Company...." 
Sixteen pages later, on page 21 of the Operating Agreement, paragraph 12.2 states 
that "This Agreement shall constitute the entire contract between the parties, and there are 
no other or further agreements outstanding not specifically mentioned herein; provided, 
however, that this Agreement may be amended, altered, supplemented or modified by the 
written agreement of all the Members..." 
a. The Trial Court erred when it found the language of the Operating 
Agreement to be unambiguous. 
Mehr testified that paragraph 3.3 required CAT to provide the funding for the 
projects which Mehr, Taggart and Coats had investigated and chosen to pursue. CAT 
attempts to rely on 3.4 as an excuse not to fund pursuant to their obligation under 3.3, which 
violates the language of 3.3 and if permitted, would render 3.3 meaningless and illusory. 
Since the language lends itself to both interpretations, then there is ambiguity in the 
document which permits the admission of parole evidence and thus properly should have 
precluded summary judgment. See Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 
1991) (stating that contract language is ambiguous ffif it is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation"). 
"In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling." John 
Call Eng'g. Inc. v. Manti City Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987). If the contract is in 
writing and the language is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined 
from the words of the agreement. See Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Natl Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229 
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(Utah 1987); Oberhanslv v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977). A court may only 
consider extrinsic evidence if, after careful consideration, the contract language is 
ambiguous or uncertain. Faulkner v. Farnsworthu 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). A 
contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because offf uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies." Jd.; see also Mann v. Wetter. 100 Or.App. 184, 785 P.2d 1064, 1067 (1990). 
Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law. Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293. 
"In [the Winegar] case, the trial court granted the Winegars' motion for summary 
judgment. The only parol evidence offered came from the Froerers and wholly supported 
their position. We must therefore assume that the trial court found the contract 
unambiguous and must have thus disregarded the Froerers1 evidence. We may uphold the 
trial court's ruling only if we agree that the contract was unambiguous. As this court 
observed in Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977), we first examine 
the language of the instrument, according to it the weight and effect it shows the parties 
intended. If the meaning is ambiguous or uncertain, parol evidence of the parties' intentions 
should be admitted. A motion for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal 
conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists and there is a factual issue as to what the 
parties intended." Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293. 
Indeed, exclusion of such evidence would deny the relevance of the parties' intentions 
and defeat the principle of contract interpretation that "the intentions of the parties are 
controlling."Winegar, at 108. Furthermore, excluding such evidence would by no means 
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gut the purpose of the parol evidence rule, which is "to limit the ability of the finder of fact 
(the jury) to believe testimony contradicting integrated writings." Corbin § 572C 
(Supp.1994). This Court should find that "[t]his is not a case where the extrinsic evidence, 
if believed by the fact finder, would contradict the parties' written agreement. Accordingly, 
[this Court should] hold that extrinsic evidence is admissible as to the issue of [whether the 
parties agreed outside the Operating Agreement which projects would be pursued, and that 
Taggart/Coats/CAT would therefore be responsible to fund the same]." Ward v. 
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1995). 
b. The Trial Court erred when it weighed Mehr's testimony and the evidence 
and made the factual determination that the Operating Agreement was an integrated 
agreement. 
"An integrated contract is an agreement where 'the parties thereto adopt a writing or 
writings as the final and complete expression of the agreement.' If a contract is determined 
to be integrated, the parol evidence rule 'excludes evidence of terms in addition to those 
found in the agreement.' 'If the contract is in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the 
intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the agreement.' 'Ambiguous' 
in this context means that the terms of the contract are 'capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies."' 
(citations and footnote omitted)" Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet 945 P. 2d 180, at 190 
(Utah App. 1997). "If the court determines that the contract terms are unambiguous, we 
interpret them according to their plain and ordinary meaning and extrinsic or parol evidence 
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is generally not admissible to explain the intent of the parties.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
"Whether contractual language is ambiguous is a question of law, reviewed for correctness." 
Id. 
As the Court stated in Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., 804 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1991). 
"If an agreement is integrated, the parol evidence rule excludes evidence of terms in addition 
to those in the agreement, thus excluding " 'contemporaneous conversations, statements, or 
representations offered for the purpose of vaiying or adding to the terms of an integrated 
contract.'" Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., 731 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1986) 
(quoting Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985)). A nonintegrated 
contract may exist where the terms are not ambiguous, but the nature of the agreement itself 
is unclear. Id. "Only when contract terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous can they 
be interpreted by the judge on a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 488. 
"The trial court must first determine if the contract is integrated, i.e., an agreement 
"where the parties thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final and complete expression of 
the agreement. An integration is the writing or writings so adopted." Eie v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981) (quoting Restatement, Contracts § 228). 
Extrinsic, relevant evidence is admissible to prove integration. Id. (quoting Bullfrog Marina, 
Inc. v. Lentz. 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972)). If extrinsic evidence is 
considered to determine whether a contract is integrated, review by an appellate court is • 
limited, as the parties' intent regarding integration is a factual question. Kimball v. 
Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
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First, there was no intent that the Operating Agreement be a final, folly integrated 
agreement between the parties. The Operating Agreement was never intended to document 
which projects the parties had agreed to pursue, and the like. Operating Agreements are 
"constitution" type documents. They provide guidance about governance, not details as to 
specific projects to be pursued. For instance, AFTER the Operating Agreement was signed, 
Taggart and Coats paid more than a half a million of their own money toward the obligations 
imposed by the Newport REPC and the Hidden Ridge projects. There is no mention of these 
projects anywhere in the Operating Agreement. However, it is absolutely absurd to claim 
that Taggart and Coats paid out that kind of money without some kind of agreement being in 
place as to those real estate projects. Clearly, there were agreements between the parties 
which were not enumerated in the boilerplate language of the Operating Agreement. 
c. The Court erred when it improperly weighed Mehr's testimony in summary 
judgment proceedings 
Defendants boldly claim that Dan Mehr's deposition testimony was at odds with the 
statements in his Supplemental Affidavit regarding the agreements which Mehr said Taggart 
and Coats had made with respect to funding. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Mehr's extensive testimony quoted in the numerous memoranda submitted in connection 
with the determination of the summary judgment issue plays out like a "one note Samba." 
Mehr unequivocally and consistently reaffirms over and over that there was an agreement 
before, during and after the execution of the Operating Agreement that Taggart and Coats 
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were obligated to fund the economically viable projects selected by the parties for 
development. 
However, as occurs with any witness, Mehr is not perfect: he slips up occasionally; 
he forgets things; he mixes some things up, and the like. CAT attempted to make hay by 
myopically zeroing in on certain answers and then arguing them out of context. CAT did 
this, ignoring the vast majority of Mehr's deposition testimony which was entirely consistent 
with his affidavits submitted in connection with opposing CAT's summary judgment. As a 
whole, Mehr's testimony is internally consistent and jives with the testimony elicited from 
Hoggan and the admissions of Taggart. 
"A single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of fact." Barnes Co. v. 
Sohio Natural Resources, Co. 626 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981) "Clearly, it is not for a court to 
weigh the evidence or assess credibility." Id. "As a matter of general evidence law, a 
deposition is generally more reliable means of ascertaining the truth than an affidavit, since 
a deponent is subject to cross-examination and an affiant is not. 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. 
Wicker, Moore }s Federal Practice § 56.11 [4] at 56-277 (1983). That does not mean, 
however, that in summary judgment proceedings, a deposition should be accorded 
greater weight than an affidavit. The purpose of summary judgment is not to weigh 
the evidence." Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, at 1172 (Utah 1983) 
"The rule that a moving party may not rely upon his own affidavit which contradicts 
his deposition must be administered with care. It is common knowledge that witnesses 
sometimes misstate themselves, may not properly understand the question propounded, or 
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give equivocal answers. The rule that a party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit that 
contradicts his deposition to create an issue of fact on a motion for summary judgment does 
not apply when there is some substantial likelihood that the deposition testimony was in 
error for reasons that appear in the deposition or the party-deponent is able to state in his 
affidavit an adequate explanation for the contradictory answer in his deposition. Boms v. 
Yellow Cab Co.. 52 Ill.App.3d 194, 9 Ill.Dec. 843, 367 N.E.2d 277 (1977); quoted in 
Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 1983). 
At the hearing on summary judgment held on December 19,2001, the Court indicated 
that Mehr's affidavit appeared to create an issue of disputed fact with respect to whether or 
not there were agreements in place between Taggart, Coats and Mehr regarding the funding 
of the Newport REPC and the Hidden Ridge projects. However, CAT's attorney argued 
vehemently that Mehr's affidavit was wholy self-serving and contradicted his deposition 
testimony. The Court requested additional briefing specifically giving CAT the opportunity 
to demonstrate to the Court that Mehr had contradicted himself. As this Court can readily 
see when examining the whole of Mehr's testimony, his positions in the deposition and in 
the affidavits submitted in connection with the summary judgment motions are very 
consistent. 
The Court erred when it excluded the extrinsic evidence presented by Mehr regarding 
the Parties' intention with respect to the question of whether or not the Operating Agreement 
was integrated, and following this exclusion of Mehr's parol affidavit and depositoin 
evidence, applied the wrong standard and improperly weighed the testimony of Dan Mehr, 
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when it went on to hold in paragraphs 5, 6,and 7 of the Partial Summary Judgment, that "no 
substantial evidence" was presented from which a finder of fact could conclude that the oral 
discussions which were held between Taggart, Coats and Mehr were intended to constitute 
independent contractual obligations outside the operating agreement or that CAT had ever 
agreed to provide financing for any of the projects to which CAT applied more than a half a 
million dollars after the Operating Agreement was executed. Accoringly, the partial 
summary judgment should be set aside and the case remanded for trial by jury on the breach 
of contract claims which were improperly dismissed. 
III. JMS DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL; IT PROPERLY 
REQUESTED JURY TRIAL AND THE GRANTING OF JURY TRIAL 
WOULD NOT HAVE CAUSED ANY PREJUDICE TO CAT- JMS IS 
ENTITLED TO HAVE THIS CASE REMANDED FOR A TRIAL DE NOVO 
BY AJURY 
The instant case was filed in the trial court in November, 1999. At that time, JMS 
made its request for jury trial and paid the $50.00 jury fee, as the docket for this case 
indicates. All opposing parties were given notice of the jury request. 
In April of 2000, a hearing on various motions involving discovery disputes was held 
before Judge Bohling. Rather than conduct an in-court hearing, Judge Bohling invited 
counsel to sit down with him in chambers to discuss the motions. No record of the in-
chamber meeting was made. 
Judge Bohling inquired as to whether the case was to be tried to the bench or to a 
jury. Mr. Mitchell, counsel for CAT, indicated that he had not made a jury request. Mr. 
Steffensen, counsel for JMS, said he believed a request had been made and that JMS 
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desired a jury trial, but that the file would have to be checked to verify. Mr. Steffensen 
further indicated that if a request had not been made, it would be. Judge Bohling indicated 
that he did not have the file at present and did not recall seeing a jury trial request. Then 
Judge Bohling indicated that he would order the trial as non-jury for the time being, but 
that if in fact the jury request had been made then JMS would get a jury trial and the order 
would be changed. JMS' counsel accepted such disposition based on the assurances of 
Judge Bohling that the jury issue would be researched and jury trial would be granted, if 
indeed it had been requested. JMS' counsel never indicated that jury trial had been 
waived or that they intended to waive jury trial. After the hearing, JMS'counsel checked 
the Court file, and found that jury had been requested. 
Subsequently, at a status conference held with Judge Bohling on March 30, 2001, 
the issue of jury trial was again raised. Mr. Steffensen indicated that jury trial had been 
requested. Mr. Mitchell argued that the case should be tried to the bench. Both sides put 
their positions on the record. Judge Bohling then ruled that his recollection was that JMS 
had waived its right to a jury trial. 
The record is devoid of any evidence that JMS waived its right to a jury trial. In a 
motion to reconsider Judge Bohling's ruling on the jury issue, JMS submitted affidavits 
of counsel Brian Steffensen and David Condie which demonstrates that JMS followed 
proper procedures for having a jury trial and did not waive same. 
JMS demanded a jury when it filed its complaint and paid the required fee. When 
the April, 2000 hearing was held, neither the parties nor Judge Bohling had the benefit of 
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having the file before them. JMS'counsel correctly stated that by their recollection jury 
had been requested. Judge Bohling indicated he did not think jury had been requested. 
This was an improper finding, with no factual basis, and it was wrong for the Judge to act 
as a witness in the matter. 
It is inappropriate for a judge to rely on his independent recollection and 
essentially become a witness in the determination of a factual matter. "The trial judge 
seemed to rely on his independent recollection of the pre-settlement hearing to interpret 
the ambiguity in the settlement order. This is clearly inappropriate." Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah App. 1988); see Can v. Bradshaw Chevrolet 
Co., 464 P.2d 580, 581 (1970). 
Although he put down in his order from that hearing that the case was to be non-
jury, Judge Bohling made clear that if, upon checking, jury had been requested that the 
case would be tried to a jury. JMS did not object to the order stating non-jury because of 
the assurances that it would be changed to jury trial if that is in fact what was requested. 
JMS relied on Judge Bohling's assurances; when, after the April, 2000 hearing they 
checked and discovered that jury had been requested, JMS' counsel believed that the case 
would be jury trial and that it was just a formality to make that change in the record. 
The Utah and U.S. Constitutions and the judiciary system give great deference to and 
place in high regard a party's right to a jury trial. The seventh amendment to the United 
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States Constitution provides that "in suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved..." 
In Utah, the right of jury trial in civil cases is guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. 
International Harvesters Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor and Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 
(Utah 1981) (Citing Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 10). In International Harvester, 
the Court wrote: "A careful reading,... of the proceedings of the (Utah) constitutional 
convention,... discloses a virtually unanimous intention on the part of the framers of the 
Constitution to preserve a constitutional right to trial by jury in civil cases and in noncapital 
criminal cases...there is repeated reference to the intention to insure the underlying right of 
trial by jury...further support for this conclusion is found in the final sentence of Article 1, 
Section 10, which states that 'a jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.' It is 
axiomatic that for there to be a waiver there must be an existing legal right which may be 
waived." Id. at 419. 420. 
In terms of the historical significance of juries and their importance in the judicial 
system, the Court in International Harvester, in the midst of finding that the right of jury trial 
in civil cases is guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, continued: "The jury historically has 
been an integral part of the Anglo-American legal system. It would require the clearest 
language to sustain the conclusion that there was an intention to abolish an institution so 
deeply rooted in our basic democratic traditions and so important in the administration of 
justice, not only as a buffer between the state and the sovereign citizens of the state, but also 
as a means for rendering justice between citizens. We refuse to give a strained meaning to 
-90-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the terms of our Constitution which would result in dispensing with an institution that has 
the sanction of the centuries." Id. at 420. 
In Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 366 (Utah 1989), the Court 
stated that "maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and 
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the 
right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care... I believe that the Utah state 
constitutional right to a jury trial on the question of civil damages is absolute." (Citations 
omitted). 
Utah Code 78-21-1, Right to Jury Trial, states, " In actions for ... money claimed as 
due upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may 
be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived." 
In addition, the language of Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure makes clear 
that the jury right is important, not to taken lightly and to be allowed unless expressly 
waived. Part (a) states: "The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution or as given 
by statute shall be preserved to the parties." As to the issue of waiver, part (d) states, "the 
failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand as required by this rule and to 
file it as required by 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury." As stated, JMS 
performed all these requirements. Thus, jury trial is not waived, and, as seen in International 
Harvester, to have a jury is a right and if it is not waived, and is demanded, jury trial must be 
granted. Given the dictates of Rule 38, Utah Code 78-21-1 Utah Constitution and the cases 
cited herein, jury trial is mandated. 
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JMS made a timely jury demand. JMS paid the jury fee. There is nothing in the 
record herein which evidences a clear and unequivocal intent by JMS to waive its sacred 
constitutional right to a trial by jury. Judge Bohling erred in depriving JMS of its right to 
trial by jury. Judge Bohling's findings and judgment against JMS must be vacated and this 
matter remanded for trial de novo by jury. 
IV. JUDGE BOHLING'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE IN MANY MATERIAL 
RESPECTS UNSUPPORTED BY THE CLEAR AND ESSENTIALLY 
UNDISPUTED FACTS ADDUCED AT TRIAL. WITH SAID FINDINGS SET 
ASIDE, JUDGE BOHLING'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT 
AGAINST JMS MUST ALSO BE SET ASIDE. JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
DIRECTED IN FAVOR OF JMS 
JMS understands that the standard of review for findings of fact is "clearly 
erroneous." But the evidence adduced at trial was essentially undisputed that Taggart and 
CAT made actionable representations and warranties to JMS, that Taggart and CAT failed to 
disclose several material facts known to them about the Hidden Ridge project, that the 
representations and warranties made were in material aspects untrue. JMS clearly 
reasonably relied thereon and was damaged thereby. Consequently, this is the unique case 
where the trial court's findings are quite clearly erroneous. 
JMS reviewed the UNDISPUTED facts in detail with the Court, first in its closing 
argument, R. 5380, 5381 and then in Plaintiffs Supplemental Post-Trial Memorandum, R. 
4194-4307 and Addendum 6 and Plaintiffs Reply Supplemental Post-Trial Memorandum, 
R. 4425-4444 and Addendum 6. Judge Bohling ignored these UNDISPUTED facts and 
announced his ruling. CAT prepared proposed findings, conclusions and a judgment. JMS 
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again set forth in detail its objection to the evidentiary foundation of the proposed findings, 
and the legal sufficiency of the conclusions, in its Objection thereto. R. 4557-4598 Again, 
Judge Bohling ignored the detailed criticism of the findings and conclusions, and announced 
that he was adopting and signing them. R. 4665-4668. 
Based upon the trial evidence marshaled by JMS set forth in the foregoing argument, 
Post-Trial memoranda, Objection and in Addendum 6, all of which are incorporated herein 
by reference due to page constraints, JMS respectfully asks this Court to conclude that the 
findings of fact complained of are clearly enoneous. JMS asks this court to agree with JMS 
that the evidence was essentially undisputed that Taggart and CAT made actionable 
representations and warranties as set forth in JMS' Post-Trial memoranda, and the like, all as 
set forth in the Post-Trial memoranda. JMS asks this court to vacate Judge Bohling's 
findings and conclusions, and to direct the entry of judgment in favor of JMS. 
V. POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: CHARGING ORDERS, ORDER OF 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND ORDERS REQUIRING ROSEN TO 
APPEAR AND FINDING ROSEN IN CONTEMPT WERE ALL 
IMPROPERLY GRANTED AND MUST BE SET ASIDE 
The Charging Orders were improperly issued on an ex parte basis and must be set 
aside. A proper, due process compliant, motion, notice, briefing and hearing would have 
afforded all interested parties to appear and participate and protect their interests. 
Constitutionally protected due process was not afforded to JMS and related entities with 
respect to the Charging Orders. 
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The Preliminary Injunction against Aspenwood improperly imposed a de facto 
receivership upon an entity - Aspenwood - which due to the granting of summary judgment 
herein was no longer a party to the suit between JMS and CAT, and which obviously was 
not a judgment debtor. Aspenwood was not properly before the Trial Court, and the Trial 
Court exceeded even its extraordinary powers by asserting itself into, and by allowing CAT 
to impose itself upon, the internal business activities and practices of Aspenwood. As 
argued at the hearing thereon, Utah law relating to limited liability companies does not allow 
creditors of members to meddle in the internal affairs of limited liability companies. 
Creditors may only seek to obtain a charging order. And, if they obtain such an order, they 
only have the right to receive such distributions as may, in the sole discretion of the 
managers of the limited liability company, be made with respect to the membership interest 
so charged. 
Trial Courts have not been granted the power to require a non-party to litigation to 
give a judgment creditor like CAT prior notice of all financial transactions, including the 
payment of its regular bills. Trial Courts have not been given the power to order any such 
non-party to take no action whatsoever without prior approval from a judgment creditor such 
as CAT, or the Court. The Trial Court essentially imposed a de facto receivership on 
Aspenwood, and made CAT the receiver thereof, with the power to veto any financial 
transaction in which Aspenwood may wish to engage. Aspenwood5s only recourse pursuant 
to Judge Bohling's order would be to appeal to the trial court. Only Bankruptcy Courts, 
pursuant to clear statutory grants of authority, can act in such a fashion. Utah law does not 
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allow such outrageous intrusions into the private, internal affairs of a third-party limited 
liability company. The order granting the injunction against Aspenwood was improvidently 
granted and was extra-jurisdictional. It must be set aside in order to protect the procedural 
and substantive Due Process rights of litigants and non-litigants alike. 
With respect to CAT's Subpoena of Harold Rosen, it is important to note that there is 
virtually no law from the Supreme or Appellate Courts of Utah regarding the scope of Rule 
69. What is the proper scope of inquiry? JMS believes that a judgment creditor's scope of 
inquiry under Rule 69 is limited to asking questions about what assets exist on the date of 
the inquiry which are owned and/or controlled by the judgment debtor, and which may be 
realized upon to satisfy the judgment debt. A judgment creditor should not be allowed to 
engage in pre-fraudulent conveyance litigation fishing expeditions about "former assets," 
and whether any assets have been transferred by the judgment debtor to third-parties. It is 
not appropriate under Rule 69 for a judgment debtor to inquire into a judgment debtor's 
financial history . It is not proper to conduct what amounts to pre-filing discovery on an 
action for an accounting or fraudulent conveyance action under the guise of a Supplemental 
Proceeding and an inquiry under Rule 69. 
In a hearing regarding the scope of the Order in Supplemental Proceedings held 
before the Court on July 19, 2001, Judge Bohling initially was properly hesitant to issue an 
order requiring non-parties JMS-Meadow,L.L.C. and JMS-Brook, L.L.C. to appear and 
provide a broad accounting of all their financial transactions as had been set forth in the 
Court's Order in Supplemental Proceedings. The Court conceded that "the Supp Order 
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Proceeding cannot require those entities to produce documents and that the inquiry is more 
limited and goes to the role in which JMS-Meadow and JMS-Brook are in part owned by the 
entities...and it's what information they have in their possession that would allow Mr. 
Mitchell to inquire about the assets that they have that would be suitable for the execution of 
a judgment." (Judge William B. Bohling, July 19, 2001). However, the Court then 
backpedaled and held that "JMS Meadow and JMS Brook, as the Court indicated, would be 
of a more limited production that would only lead to documents in the possession of JMS 
Financial as opposed to...or Hidden, as opposed to these other entities, but to the extent that 
JMS Financial has financial documents of those two entities that would apprize Mr. Mitchell 
of what assets might be available for execution or otherwise become the basis for recovering 
under the Order, and those documents are likewise available for examination...should be 
made available for examination." (Id.) 
Recognizing that it was technically ordering JMS-Financial and JMS-Hidden to 
appear, albeit through Hal Rosen, purportedly in his capacity as President of JD-West 
Associates, Inc., the Court backpedaled once again as it struggled to articulate some legal 
basis upon which to require that the private financial documents of the non-parties JMS-
Meadow and JMS-Brook be produced. 
Mr. Condie: So essentially, so I'm clear, what Your Honor is purporting to do, 
technically, is to require JMS Financial and JMS Hidden to appear, and further you're 
requiring those entities to produce Mr. Rosen to testify on their behalf. 
Mr. Mitchell: With documents in the possession of JMS Financial and Mr. Rosen. 
Judge Bohling... don't think that Mr. Rosen has to produce JMS Meadow and JMS 
Brook documents that are not in the possession of JMS Financial and JMS Hidden. 
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Mr. Condie: Okay, so if Mr. Rosen, as CPA, has documents which he has as their 
CPA, he does not have to produce those. 
Judge: Correct. (July 19, 2001 hearing) 
After further discussion as to Mr. Rosen's appearance, the Court indicated that "JMS 
Financial and JMS Hidden are to appear. Mr. Rosen is to appear and testify as the 
president ofJD West with respect to JMS Financial and JMS Hidden. Thafs what Fm 
ordering "(Id.) 
Mr. Rosen did appear and completely complied with the order of the Court. He 
appeared as president of JD West Associates, Inc., and testified and provided the documents 
in his possession pertaining to the financial affairs, assets and liabilities of JMS-Hidden and 
JMS-Financial, and provided updated documents pertaining to those entities' financial 
condition. However, Mr. Mitchell made it abundantly clear that he wanted to depose Mr. 
Rosen as to Aspenwood, L.L.C.'s financial affairs - not the judgment debtors' financial 
affairs, and Aspenwood's creditors, etc., as well as the internal affairs and business dealings 
of JMS-Meadow and JMS-Brook - two other non-parties to this litigation. Mr. Rosen 
objected to such attempted inquiries. (Rosen, Depo. July 30, 2001 p. 6:18-21. Entire 
transcript is found, at R. 5126-5195, and in Addendum 8) 
Mitchell repeatedly bereated and badgered Mr. Rosen concerning the internal affairs 
and dealings of Aspenwood. Again, Mr. Rosen objected, and indicated that "...The notice 
that I received Thursday required that I in my capacity as J.D. West appear and answer 
questions about JMS-Financial and JMS-Hidden....As I read that notice, it doesn't talk about 
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Aspenwood, it talks about JMS Hidden, it talks about JMS-Financial. Fve come prepared to 
talk about those two entities." (Rosen Depo p. 14:18 to 15:10) 
Mr. Mitchell replied, "We'll save a lot of time if you will give me the information 
about Aspenwood, because one way or the other I assure you the Court is going to require 
that." (Rosen Depo. p. 15:11-13) 
Mr. Rosen did provide some information concerning Aspenwood, definitely more so 
than he could reasonably have been expected to provide pursuant to the order of the Court. 
Mr. Mitchell also persisted in seeking information pertaining to the internal affairs 
and business dealings of JMS-Meadow and JMS-Brook. Mr. Rosen objected that such 
questions were outside the scope of the order. However, in the spirit of cooperation, he did 
provide information concerning both of those entities and their respective projects. 
When Mitchell refused to cease his fishing expedition, Mr. Rosen replied "Once 
again, I think we're talking about the internal affairs of JMS Meadow, and that's outside the 
scope of the supp order." (Rosen Depo. p. 22:4-6) 
Mr. Mitchell's response (Rosen Depo. p. 22:7-9) made it clear that Mitchell believed 
that the internal affairs of JMS-Meadow were within the scope of the Supp Order. His 
cavalier attitude toward Mr. Rosen thinly veil his confidence that he could easily get Judge 
Bohling to abuse his power and jurisdiction and get an Order compelling answers via a supp 
order from a non-party to the litigation - not about the judgment debtors' assets, but about 
the third-, non-party's assets and financial affairs. Indeed, in a subsequent hearing on an 
Order to Show Cause, over counsel's strenuous objections and without even taking the time 
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to so much as look at the deposition transcript, Judge Bohling berated counsel in open court 
and sanctioned Mr. Rosen and the JMS entities, stating: "I'm going to order that Mr. 
Rosen appear and answer the questions that are asked..." (Judge Bohling, August 21, 
2001) Based on Judge Bohling's actions and demeanor in this hearing, Judge Bohling was 
ultimately recused. 
The Order of Contempt must be vacated. The Order forcing Harold Rosen to 
breach is duty of confidentiality to third-parties Aspenwood, JMS-Meadow and JMS-Brook 
must also be vacated. 
SUMMARY OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
Aspenwood respectfully requests that the Summary Judgment dismissing its claims 
against CAT, Taggart and Coats be set aside and that those matters be remanded for further 
discovery and trial on the merits. 
JMS respectfully requests that Judge Bohling's trial rulings and judgment be vacated, 
and that judgment instead be entered in its favor and against CAT and Taggart. 
Alternatively, JMS requests that Judge Bohling's trial rulings and judgment be vacated, and 
that this matter be remanded, and that on remand, JMS be allowed a full and fair opportunity 
to complete its discovery, and that its claims be tried to a jury. 
JMS and Aspenwood ask that the post-trial rulings made by Judge Bohling be 
reversed. 
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Respectfully submitted this 15th day of April, 2002. 
Steffensen Law Office 
Srian W. Steffe 
Dafaian E. Dz 
William J.Middleton 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A "J 
I hereby certify that on the lS day of / ^ /W 2&s>2 I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Brief to be X mailed, postage prepaid; and/or hand-delivered 
by fax and/or by courier; addressed to: 
Burbidge & Mitchell 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1103 
FAX 
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